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ABSTRACT 
Financial analysts play an intermediary role in financial markets, resulting in two 
steps for information to be fully absorbed into the stock price: analysts’ reaction to in-
formation, and investors’ reaction to analysts’ recommendations. Thus any observed inef-
ficiency in stock pricing could result from two possibilities: analysts failed to fully incor-
porate the market information into their stock analysis, or the information released in the 
analysts’ report is not fully believed by investors.  
The documented optimism of financial analysts may suggest the possibility of the 
later case. To test the accuracy of analysts from another perspective, we follow a market 
microstructure model and use intraday market data to estimate the probability of an in-
formation event, the probability of good or bad news, and the rates that different traders 
arrive at the market.  
By comparing those estimates based on days with and without recommendation 
changes, we find inconsistent results with regard to a difference in the probability of an 
information event. For some stocks, we do observe an increase in the likelihood of news 
on days when analysts change their recommendations, but this is not the case for most 
stocks. However, even though they are inaccurate most of the time, uninformed investors 
usually believe financial analysts. Furthermore, it seems that uninformed investors disbe-
lieve analyst recommendation changes at those instances when analysts are most accurate.  
Because of this, we hypothesise that market makers might suspect that orders in 
the opposite direction of an analyst’s recommendation change are more likely to come 
from informed traders. This is consistent with the intuition that most traders are unin-
formed and will simply follow the advice of a perceived expert, and therefore those that 
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don’t follow that advice may be more likely to have special information of their own. We 
check whether there are any differences in the probability of information-based trading 
(PIN) and for the conditional probability of information-based trading conditioned on sell 
(PIN|sell) and buy (PIN|buy) between days with and without recommendation changes. 
We did not find any significant difference, indicating that although we may observe a 
higher arrival rate of informed traders on recommendation change days, the probabilities 
of information-based trading do not change substantially. More informed traders seem to 
come to the market merely because the higher arrival rate of uninformed traders on rec-
ommendation days gives them a good opportunity to camouflage their behaviour. And 
the specialists likely would not have to change their behaviour on those days by increas-
ing or shifting bid-ask spreads since the increased costs from the higher volume of in-
formed trading are balanced by increased profits from the higher volume of uninformed 
trading. 
Furthermore, regression of the probabilities of informed trading (conditional or 
unconditional) on firm size, trading volume, and volatility of daily return shows nothing 
significant, so we weren’t able to identify influential factors that affect informed trading 
or explain differences in informed trading between firms. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Analysts are those financial professionals who collect and evaluate the informa-
tion related to a firm’s future performance and in turn release their findings in research 
reports. They produce corporate earnings forecasts, write reports on individual companies, 
provide industry and sector analyses, and issue stock recommendations. Academic re-
searchers have been interested in the function analysts provide to the financial market for 
a long time. However, “few issues in finance are more puzzling than the role played by 
financial analysts”, as Easley et al. (1998) said. What we know for sure is that more than 
3,000 sell-side analysts are currently working in the United States, not including associ-
ates and other junior analysts that provide research support (according to Jegadeesh et al. 
2004); and each year they spend hundreds of millions of dollars on their analysis activi-
ties. 
 There are two main types of analysts: sell-side analysts and buy-side analysts. 
Sell-side analysts are those employed by a broker or dealer firm that manages client ac-
counts and serves individual and institutional investors; and buy-side analysts are those 
employed by money management firms or institutional investors (mutual funds, for ex-
ample). However, in most cases, only the recommendations from sell-side analysts are 
made available to the public. They place stocks on a “buy” list, disseminate written re-
ports, and make recommendations to appropriate clients, whereas recommendations from 
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buy-side analysts will be executed immediately as part of the investment strategy of their 
own companies, and are not shared with the public. Furthermore, buy-side analysts often 
use the reports from sell-side analysts as an input into their decision process. Following 
previous academic research, in this thesis we only consider sell-side analysts. 
This chapter includes two sections: Section 1 discusses the optimism of financial 
analysts observed in the literature and the possible motivations for doing that; and Sec-
tion 2 introduces the motivation for this research and the methodology we used for analy-
sis. 
1.1 OPTIMISM OF FINANCIAL ANALYSTS 
1.1.1 THE ACCURACY OF ANALYSTS 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that security analysts are socially productive 
for the role they play in reducing agency costs associated with the separation of owner-
ship from control. This hypothesis was supported by empirical evidence given by Moyer 
et al. (1989). Further affirmation came from an extensive literature in the 1980s, (for ex-
ample, Brown and Rozeff (1978), Collins and Hopwood (1980), and Givoly and Lakon-
ishok (1984)), demonstrating that analysts’ earnings forecasts are more accurate predic-
tors of future earnings than univariate time-series models or other naïve forecasts. More 
recently, Frederickson and Miller (2004) disclosed that analysts assess stock prices more 
accurately than non-professional investors when both pro forma and GAAP earnings are 
available.  
Unfortunately, several studies in the 1990s on the accuracy of analysts failed to 
find consistent results. The optimistic bias in the forecast error of the EPS has been 
widely documented. Francis and Philbrick (1993) argued that analysts make optimistic 
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forecasts to maintain relationships with company managers. Clayman and Schwartz 
(1994) attributed the positive bias to analysts' tendency to "fall in love" with their stocks, 
proposing that investment banking relationships and the prospect of being cut off from 
access to company managers make issuing negative or critical reports difficult for ana-
lysts. Dreman and Berry (1995) established the persistent presence of an optimistic bias 
in analysts working in the U. S. market between 1974 and 1991 and found no significant 
differences in this optimism among industries or economic cycles. Olsen (1996) ascribed 
the positive bias and lack of accuracy in earnings estimates to herding behaviour among 
forecasters. The same persistent optimism has been documented for equity markets in the 
United Kingdom (Capstaff et al. 1995; De Bondt and Forbes 1999), Germany (Capstaff et 
al. 1998), and Europe (Capstaff et al. 2001). 
On the contrary, a handful of studies recently failed to reject unbiasedness and ef-
ficiency in analyst forecasts after "correcting" methodological flaws or assuming non-
standard analyst loss functions (see Basu and Markov 2004). Brown (2001) found that the 
mean and median forecasts during the 16 years from 1984 to 1999 indicate a shift from 
analyst optimism toward analyst pessimism. Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003) reported that 
median forecast errors are most often zero and the percentage of apparently pessimistic 
errors is greater than the percentage of apparently optimistic errors in the cross-section. 
They also identified an empirical link between firms' recognition of unexpected accruals 
and the presence of forecast errors, suggesting that firms’ reporting choices play an im-
portant role in determining analyst forecast errors.  
A similar confusing story happened with stock recommendations. Womack (1996) 
found that investment strategies based on following analyst advice typically yielded a re-
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turn on investment that is higher than average. Wijmenga (1990) documented that while 
there is no significant long-term abnormal return to the stock recommendations, abnormal 
returns are very significant for the week of publication, and short-term abnormal returns 
are more pronounced for strong recommendations. Barber et al. (2001) found U.S. sell-
side analysts' stock recommendations have significant value for the 1986-96 period: A 
portfolio composed of the most highly recommended stocks generated an average annual 
market-adjusted return of 3.97 whereas a portfolio of the least favoured stocks yielded an 
average annual market-adjusted return of –9.06 percent, a difference of more than 13 per-
centage points. On the other hand, contradictory evidence is found by Barber et al (2003) 
when data from year 2000 and 2001 are included: the stocks least favoured by analysts 
earned an average annualized market-adjusted return of 13.44 percent whereas the stocks 
most highly recommended underperformed the market by –7.06%, a return difference of 
more than 20 percentage points.1 Jaffe and Mahoney (1999) reported that common stock 
recommendations in investment newsletters do not beat passive benchmarks. Yazici and 
Muradoglu (2002) showed that published investment advice does not help small investors. 
Jegadeesh et al. (2004) warned that naive adherence to analyst stock recommendations 
can be costly.  
1.1.2 ANALYSTS’ INCENTIVES  
The documented inaccuracy of analysts gives rise to greater concerns for aca-
demic researchers. Dreman and Berry (1995) expressed a puzzle in the persistent nature 
of large forecasting errors, which is unlikely to be observed if analysts learn from past 
mistakes as rational decision makers are expected to do. They called for a “behavioural 
                                                 
1 In spite of this, for the longer 1986-2001 period, the most highly recommended stocks still generated sig-
nificantly greater average annual market-adjusted returns than did those least favoured (2.44 percent as 
compared with –9.94 percent). 
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explanation” with the question “Is it possible that the ‘best’ analysts' judgmental forecasts 
may not be the ‘best’ forecasts career wise?” They suggest that an estimate far off the 
consensus might pose career dangers, whereas an estimate near the consensus may pro-
vide the analyst with a much higher degree of safety, regardless of how inaccurate it may 
prove to be. Olsen (1996) supported this by showing that analysts who otherwise would 
tend toward a below-average forecast are drawn toward the mean and are unwilling to 
fully reflect the negative view in their forecasts because the market appreciates an opti-
mistic outlook. Hong and Kubik (2003) concluded that after controlling for accuracy, 
analysts who are more optimistic than the consensus are more likely to experience posi-
tive career moves. 
 Might it be that analysts purposely overstate a stock’s valuation to attract public 
attention to promote the underwriting business of their companies? This possibility, 
called analysts’ misaligned incentive, attracted the attention of academic researchers and 
regulators, especially during the 1990s. During that time, analysts became an integral part 
of Wall Street profit centers, thus obtaining the name “Age of the Analysts” on Wall 
Street by Nocera (1997). Thus the effect of investment banking relationships on analysts’ 
stock recommendations has been studied empirically. Dugar and Nathan (1995) showed 
that financial analysts of brokerage firms that provide investment banking services are 
more optimistic in their earnings forecasts and investment recommendations, compared 
to non-investment banking analysts. Lin and McNichols (1998) found that lead and co-
underwriter analysts' growth forecasts and recommendations are significantly more fa-
vourable than those made by unaffiliated analysts, although their earnings forecasts are 
not generally greater. Michaely and Womack (1999) showed that “buy” recommenda-
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tions by underwriter analysts perform more poorly than those by unaffiliated brokers. 
This is true prior to, at the time of, and subsequent to the recommendation date, so they 
concluded that the recommendations by underwriter analysts show significant evidence 
of bias. These studies provide evidence consistent with the belief that brokerage houses 
reward optimistic analysts who generate investment banking business and trading com-
missions. 
However, this is not accepted by all researchers. Analysts cherish their reputation 
for forecasting expertise because the expertise in earnings forecasts and stock picking are 
the two most important criteria for each year’s Institutional Investor ranking of money 
manager. The top three vote getters in each industry are called All-American, and a high 
ranking in this poll will benefit the brokerage houses greatly by increasing the influential 
ability among the buy-side analysts. Analysts also benefit directly through bonuses and 
salary increases, so it is hard to believe that they would want to sacrifice accuracy, or at 
least they will be very careful in their choice between an upward-biased forecast to pro-
mote their firm’s investment business and being accurate to improve their own reputation. 
1.2 MOTIVATION AND METHODOLOGY 
Taking into consideration the intermediary role that financial analysts play in se-
curities markets, there are two steps for information to be fully absorbed into the stock 
price: The first one is analysts’ reaction to information and the second is investors’ reac-
tion to analyst recommendations. This is particularly relevant when markets have many 
investors who feel uncertain about their decisions because the economic environment is 
sufficiently complex for them. They usually choose to turn to financial analysts, who 
have the expertise to make more precise estimates, for advice and guidance. Thus any 
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observed forecast errors could result from two possibilities: analysts fail to fully incorpo-
rate relevant information into their stock analysis, or the information released in the ana-
lysts’ report is not fully believed by the investors. Either will lead to inefficient pricing of 
securities, although a simultaneous failure of both may not. We can think of these as ei-
ther a direct failure or a perceived failure to properly gather or analyse information.  
With the documented optimism of financial analysts, one may argue that joint 
failure is likely, at least for positive recommendations. That is investors are sceptical 
about the incentives of analysts, so do not fully believe what analysts recommend, which 
tends to be overly optimistic.2 Brown (1996) argued using indirect evidence that inves-
tors rely too little on analysts’ earnings forecasts, instead of too much as claimed by 
Dreman and Berry (1995). Morgan and Stocken (2003) modeled a financial market con-
taining a firm, a sell-side equity analyst, and many investors who are uncertain of the mo-
tivations of the analyst. Assuming that the market is efficient and investors are risk neu-
tral, the firm’s stock price equals the firm’s expected value given all publicly available 
information; the payoff to the analyst is composed by two parts: the benefit associated 
with his/her ability to inflate the stock price above its true value to generate investment 
banking business, and the cost associated with poor performance which will harm his/her 
poll ranking, they showed that investors’ uncertainty about their incentives makes it im-
possible for an analyst to credibly reveal good news about a firm’s valuation, even when 
the analysts’ incentives are perfectly aligned with those of investors. Only for unfavour-
able reports could all relevant information be impounded into the stock price.  
                                                 
2 This is still the case even with the efforts of the Securities Industry Association who released “Best Prac-
tices” guidelines to enhance analyst credibility, since “… the guidelines are good, but that they have no 
teeth; … Moreover, most of the firms that signed on say they already conform largely -- or completely -- to 
what the guidelines lay out, and plan only moderate policy changes.” (By Jeff D. Opdyke “Guidelines Aim 
to Polish Analysts' Image”. Wall Street Journal; Jun 13, 2001. p. C.1). 
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More uncertainty about the accuracy of analysts could exist after the effectiveness 
of Regulation Fair Disclosure3 (Reg FD) on October 23, 2000, which prohibits the selec-
tive disclosure of material information to financial analysts. Since then, financial analysts 
only have access to public information that is available to all investors, so it is quite pos-
sible that their information is different from the information of truly informed insiders, 
leading to more doubt from investors and market makers.  
Since the studies from return perspective done in the previous literature could not 
tell us whether it is inaccurate analysts’ reaction to information and/or improper inves-
tors’ reaction to analyst recommendation, in this thesis, we test the accuracy of financial 
analysts from another perspective by using a market microstructure model. Investors of-
ten need to complete their transactions on an exchange, and exchanges like the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE) are characterized by specialists who carry inventory and make a 
market by buying and selling each particular stock. The behaviour of these market mak-
ers may reveal to us some information about the quality of analyst recommendations.  
Models about the specialists that are relevant to our study started with Glosten 
and Milgrom (1985), who modeled a market with trades occurring according to the fol-
lowing sequence: The specialist sets bid and ask prices. An investor arrives and is in-
formed of the bid and ask prices. He is free to buy at the ask or sell at the bid or just leave. 
After he has made a decision, the specialist is free to (and generally will) change the bid 
and ask prices at any time before the next arriving investor. Suppose that the specialists 
know the true value of the stock will be either low ( dV ) or high ( uV ), they will set bid and 
ask prices as 
                                                 
3 Securities and Exchange Commission, Regulation FD, Code of Federal Regulations 243, 100-243.103. 
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where 1S denotes the event that a trader wants to sell to the market maker and 1B  the event 
that someone wants to buy from the market maker. They illustrated that solving the ad-
verse selection problem gives rise to the bid-ask spread. The bid-ask spread is the sum of 
the so-called "lemons discount" and “peach premium”. If the "lemons discount" and the 
“peach premium” are symmetrically distributed, the mid price is equal to the average full-
information price (Garleanu and Pedersen 2004). However, with intervention from finan-
cial analysts, the specialist may value the “lemons discount” and “peach premium” 
asymmetrically. For example, he may give a larger discount for the bid price and a 
smaller premium for the ask price when financial analysts make a “buy” recommendation, 
in which case the midpoint price would be lower than the full-information price, which 
could be interpreted by the market as financial analysts being overly optimistic.  
Easley et al. (2002) give a structural model based on the sequential trade tree dia-
gram shown in Figure 1 (More details are given in Chapter 2). This allows us to observe a 
particular sequence of trades and work backwards to discover information about the un-
derlying structural parameters. In our research, we add a third class of traders into the 
model, analyst followers, who base their trades on analyst recommendations. Including 
this third class of trader will allow the market maker to observe an increase in trading 
volume on days when analysts change their recommendations without necessarily in-
creasing his assessed likelihood that an information event has occurred. 
The approach involves using intraday market data and assessing whether the 
transactions recorded are initiated by buyers or sellers. The arrival of the various investor 
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types is modeled as following Poisson processes. The structural parameters including in-
formation event probabilities and the arrival rates of different traders are estimated using 
a maximum likelihood technique and are compared on days with and without recommen-
dation changes. Furthermore, based on the estimated parameters, the unconditional and 
conditional probabilities of information-based trading on days with and without recom-
mendation changes can be estimated and compared.  
 
Figure 1: Tree diagram of the trading process  
 
 
Information  
Event Occurs α 
Information Event Does Not Occur (1- α) 
Signal Low δ 
Buy Arrival Rate: εb 
Sell Arrival Rate: εs+μ
Buy Arrival Rate: εb+μ  
Sell Arrival Rate: εs
Buy Arrival Rate: εb 
Sell Arrival Rate: εs 
Signal High (1- δ) 
α is the probability of an information event, δ is the probability of a low signal, εb is the arri-
val rate of uninformed buy orders, and εs is the arrival rate of uninformed sell orders, and  μ 
is the arrival rate of informed trade. Nodes to the left of the dotted line occur once per day.  
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The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a compre-
hensive review of the literature on market microstructure, the asymmetry between bid 
and ask prices; the difference between informed and uninformed traders and the informa-
tion content of analyst recommendations. Chapter 3 discusses the methodology and data 
in detail. Chapter 4 presents the results of empirical tests and analyses the findings. The 
conclusions are summarised in Chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER 2  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter reviews the findings of previous studies on areas relevant to this the-
sis. Section 1 provides a review of literature on market microstructure, focusing on the 
information content of trades. The first part of this section discusses what kind of infor-
mation the trade process has, and the second part talks about empirical methodology used 
in the model of information-based trading. Section 2 discusses the asymmetry between 
bid and ask prices. Section 3 reviews studies on informed and uninformed traders, sup-
porting the notion that financial analysts are not informed traders. Section 4 documents 
the literature about the information content of analyst recommendations.  
2.1 INFORMATION CONTENT OF TRADES 
Information4 is the most important factor when traders formulate their expecta-
tions of stock value. Akerlof (1970) shows that asymmetric information, a situation 
where agents are differently informed and some may even have superior information, 
concerns the financial market. People are suspicious that they may purchase a stock from 
a better-informed seller. Since the better-informed owner would be unwilling to sell at a 
price lower than the fundamental value of the stock, it is likely that the buyer has paid too 
                                                 
4 Information is defined by Henri Theil as a change in expectations about the outcome of an event, Eco-
nomics and Information Theory (Chicago and Amsterdam: Rand McNally and North Holland Publishing 
Company, 1967), Ch.1. 
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much. Awareness of the existence of this information asymmetry leads investors to value 
information greatly and to widely pursue it in the market.  
With the notion of rational expectations equilibrium (REE), Danthine (1978) il-
lustrated that in a situation where agents are heterogeneously informed, all the relevant 
information will finally be aggregated in the equilibrium price and is revealed freely to all 
market participants. This corresponded to what Fama (1970) described as strong form 
market efficiency where the prices fully reflect all public and private information. How-
ever Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) questioned the possibility of an informationally effi-
cient market: if the equilibrium price will freely reveal all of the information, why should 
traders expend resources to obtain private information? If no traders are interested in ob-
taining information, there is no way that the equilibrium price can be an information ag-
gregator and transmitter. This is a vicious cycle. Besides, the assumption in REE that 
market participants understand the environment in which they operate and are able to ex-
tract all the information concealed in the equilibrium price looks too strong for the real 
world.  
A more practical situation is one where some, but not all, information will be ag-
gregated and transmitted by the equilibrium price, described in the literature as a “noisy 
rational expectation equilibrium”, where the incentive to collect information remains 
(Diamond and Verrecchia 1981). Thus, how new information is incorporated into prices 
via interaction of informed and uninformed traders or how the true value is discovered 
through the trading process, leads to a branch of financial economics known as “market 
microstructure”.  
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“Market microstructure” terminology was first used by Garman (1976). Since 
then, there has been a sizable increase in research on it, characterized by “theoretical 
rigor and extensive empirical validation using new databases” (Madhavan and Pancha-
pagesan, 2000). Schwartz (1988) defined it as “focused on the details of the trading proc-
ess. The major elements of this process include the generation and dissemination of in-
formation, the arrival of orders, and the rules, institutions, and other design features of a 
market that determine how orders are transformed into trades”. Although market micro-
structure has broader interest in topic, information is particularly emphasized in the the-
ory. The central concept is that the trade itself conveys information, and the continued 
trading of the informed traders provides at least the potential for the other uninformed 
market participants to infer the underlying information.  
In microstructure models, the key to understanding the dynamics of price adjust-
ment is the Bayesian learning model. This model was first implemented to microstructure 
by Conroy and Winkler (1981), dealing with how the market maker learns new informa-
tion from the arrival and composition of trades. Market makers play a passive role by ad-
justing quotes of bid and ask prices in response to changing conditions in the market. In a 
Bayesian learning model, the market maker (and other uninformed traders) does not 
know what the “true” value of the asset is. What he must do is infer this true value using 
the indirect evidence from the order flow. Suppose he has a prior belief about the asset 
value. Then he observes the market data and based on this data he calculates the condi-
tional probability that a particular event has occurred. This conditional probability is his 
posterior probability of the event, and it incorporates the new information he has learned 
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from observing the trade. This is an updating process which continues with the posteriors 
eventually converging to the true value.  
2.1.1 INFORMATION FROM A TRADE PROCESS 
Although the learning process is simple to understand, the order flow from which 
the market maker infers the true value of the asset (as mentioned above) varies in the lit-
erature. For example, in Glosten-Milgrom’s (1985) model, it is the type of the next trade 
that matters, i.e. a buy or a sell; in Kyle’s (1985) model, the market maker learns from the 
net imbalance of buys and sells. Other information like total volume, transaction size, etc., 
has been studied as well.  
A. Information Surprise 
Glosten and Milgrom (1985) showed that someone wishing to buy causes the 
market maker to revise his expectation of the asset’s value upward and his quotes accord-
ingly; and someone wishing to sell causes the market maker to revise his expectation and 
quotes downward. In Kyle’s (1985) model, the market maker in a market with sequential 
auctions simply acts as an order processor, observing net order imbalance (the accumula-
tion of signed orders) in one auction period, setting a price equal to his new expectation 
of the asset value, and then trading the quantity necessary at this price to clear the market. 
The assumption in both models is that buys and sells should be equally likely. So the im-
balance of order flow actually serves as an information surprise to the market maker.  
This was empirically supported. Hasbrouck (1988) examined the relation between 
trades and quote revisions for NYSE stocks and noted that if there were any private in-
formation inferred from a trade, it must be inferred from trade innovation, the component 
which was unanticipated, not from the total trade. Hasbrouck (1991) modeled the interac-
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tions of security trades and quote revisions by a vector autoregressive system in which 
the information content of a trade is measured by the persistent price impact of the trade 
innovation. They confirmed that market participants (including specialists) revise their 
information to incorporate an assessment of the conveyed information signal, and the 
stock price impact is increasing with the magnitude of the unexpected component of trad-
ing activity.  
B. Trading Volume 
Beaver (1968) initiated a stream of studies using volume to test investors’ reac-
tions to the release of information. He argued that the volume reaction to a new piece of 
information is due to the lack of consensus among investors and if consensus were 
reached, there would be no volume reaction, but only a price reaction. That is to say, the 
change of price reflects the average change in traders’ beliefs, while volume reflects the 
extent of the differences in their beliefs. However, Verrecchia (1981) continued the study 
on earnings announcement event and found that the degree of volume reaction to new 
information cannot be used to infer the extent of agreement among investors about how 
that information should be interpreted, because a volume increase may indicate that in-
vestors interpret the information differently, or it may be that they interpret the informa-
tion identically, but that information is quite different from their prior expectations. This 
is formalized in a model of trading volume developed by Karpoff (1986).5 Besides, Ver-
recchia (1981) suggested that it is possible to combine volume reaction with price reac-
tion to measure the extent to which information can change expectations.  
Holthausen and Verrecchia (1990) identify two effects of information releases: an 
informedness effect measuring the extent to which agents become more knowledgeable, 
                                                 
5 Volume is treated as the number of transactions between buyers and sellers in this model. 
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and a consensus effect measuring the extent of agreement among agents at the time of 
information release. They demonstrated that the unexpected price changes and trading 
volume are each influenced by both informedness and consensus effects, thus interpreta-
tions of unexpected price changes and volume associated with information releases are 
“conceptually similar”. Following that, a number of event studies use trading volume to 
determine whether an event has “information content”.  
Empirical research also indicates that volume is negatively related to the bid-ask 
spread (see Cohen et al. 1979 for an early survey). Copeland and Galai (1983) said the 
bid and ask prices given by the market maker weigh the costs from informed traders to 
the revenues from uninformed traders. Several theoretical models consider the relation of 
trading volume to price change. Copeland (1976) derived a model with the assumption of 
sequential information arrival and demonstrated that by assuming the symmetrical distri-
bution of optimists and pessimists, the absolute value of price changes and the expected 
number of trades show a positive correlation with a logarithmically increasing function. 
Another model considered price and volume in noisy rational expectations equilibrium 
and showed that the magnitude of the price change is uncorrelated with trading by specu-
lators with private information but is positively related to trading by liquidity-motivated 
investors (see Karpoff 1986). So the strength of the correlation between absolute price 
changes and volume is negatively related to the existence of private information. 
C. Trade Size 
In Glosten and Milgrom’s (1985) model, traders are assumed to buy or sell one 
unit of the asset each time. Easley and O’Hara (1987) weakened this assumption and al-
lowed the traders to choose to trade with different quantities. They showed that due to the 
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quantity bias that informed traders prefer to trade larger amounts at any given price rela-
tive to uninformed traders, market makers must also depend on the trade size when mak-
ing their pricing strategy, because the larger the trade size, the more probable it is that 
they are trading with better informed traders, i.e. there is an increased probability of in-
formation-based trading.  
Relevant to the relationship between trade size and the quality of information pos-
sessed, some studies showed that informed traders prefer to trade large amounts at any 
given price (Holthausen and Verrecchia, 1990, for example). Trade size is likely to be 
positively related to the quality of information possessed by them. Holden and Subrahan-
yam (1992) claimed that better-informed traders would trade more aggressively in order 
to obtain the benefits of private information before it becomes public. On the other hand, 
some models indicate that a monopolist informed trader may camouflage his trading ac-
tivity by splitting one large trade into several small trades over time (Kyle 1985) or by 
trading when liquidity volume is high (Admati and Pfleiderer 1988). Barclay and Warner 
(1993) found that informed traders concentrate their orders on medium-sized trades. They 
proposed a “stealth trading” hypothesis stating that during a period of time, the informed 
traders attempt to camouflage their private information by engaging in multiple smaller 
trades rather than to achieve their desired portions by one or two larger trades. This hy-
pothesis was supported by the results from the data of 105 NYSE firms that were tender-
offer targets between 1981 and 1984. They concluded that trades motivated by private 
information are generally of medium size, defined as trades between 500 and 9,900 
shares. Thus trade size will not necessarily convey adverse information. Besides, the rela-
tionship between adverse selection spread and the size of the trade is not agreed upon 
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unanimously. Huang and Stoll (1997) provided evidence that adverse selection spread 
measures increases with raw size of the trade. In contrast, Heflin and Shaw (2005) argued 
that adverse-selection measures are not increasing with the raw number of shares traded, 
but with the trade size scaled by depth. 
So, what kind of information does the trade process really provide? Jones et al. 
(1994) clarified that the relation between volume and volatility frequently analyzed in 
finance literature reflects the positive relation between volatility and the number of trans-
actions in fact. They showed that the number of trades appears to provide virtually all the 
explanation for the volatility-volume relation, with trade size playing a trivial role. This is 
consistent with the finding of McInish and Wood (1991), who decomposed the volume 
into the number of trades and the number of shares per trade, and found that the number 
of trades is dominant in the relationship with returns. What is more intriguing is that 
Jones et al. (1994) claimed that more theoretical work is needed to determine which fea-
tures of the trade process are indeed the information pertinent to the pricing of securities. 
This was then argued by Easley et al. (1997) by stating that in fact “what is needed is an 
empirical methodology for using the structure of existing microstructure models in em-
pirical research” and then they developed such a framework to analyze the information in 
the trading process. 
2.1.2 THE PROBABILITY OF INFORMATION-BASED TRADING 
Easley et al. (1997) illustrated a technique to estimate the parameters in the Easley 
and O’Hara (1992) theoretical microstructure model from a time series of trade data. The 
theoretical model given by Easley and O’Hara (1992) involves a sequential trade model 
similar in spirit to Glosten and Milgrom (1985). The strength of a sequential trade model 
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is that it allows the adjustment of prices to information to be analyzed on a trade-by-trade 
basis. In this model, the market maker is assumed to be risk neutral and competitive. 
Traders arrive individually at the market according to a probabilistic structure. Following 
each arrival, the market maker revises her quotes based on information revealed by the 
trading process. Figure 1 is a tree diagram of this sequential trading process.6 
The probability that an information event has occurred before the start of a trading 
day is α. The new information is a signal regarding the underlying asset value, where 
good news occurs with a probability (1 – δ), leading the asset value to uiV and bad news 
occurs with a probability δ, leading the asset value to diV . Trading is repeated over trad-
ing days i = 1, …, I as a game between the market maker and traders. On day i, trade be-
gins with traders arriving according to Poisson processes throughout the day. Orders from 
uninformed buyers arrive at rate εb, and orders from uninformed sellers arrive at rate εs. 
Informed traders only buy if they have seen good news and sell if they have seen bad 
news. Orders from informed traders on information event days arrive at rate μ. The trad-
ing process is as follows: The market maker observes the trade, and uses this information 
to update his beliefs. Then new prices are set, trades evolve, and the price process moves 
in response to the market makers’ changing beliefs.  
Induced by this model, the likelihood function for a single trading day is 
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6 This is given in Easley et al. (2002), which is developed in a series of papers by Easley et al. (1997), Eas-
ley et al. (1998), and Easly et al. (2001).  
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where B and S represent total buy trades and sell trades for the day respectively, and θ = 
(α, μ, εb, εs, δ) is the parameter vector. This likelihood is a mixture of distributions where 
the trade outcomes are weighted by the probability of it being a good-news day, α(1 – δ), 
a bad-news day, αδ, and a no-news day, 1 – α. Assuming days are independent, the like-
lihood of observing the data M = {(Bi, Si), i = 1, …, I} over I trading days is just the prod-
uct of the daily likelihood function, that is  
),()(
1
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I
i
SBLML ∏
=
θ=θ                                                                                     (2.2) 
where ),( ii SB is trade data for day i = 1, …, I. Maximizing (2.2) over θ using the data set 
M provides a way to determine estimates for the underlying structural parameters of the 
model. The authors used GRADX from the GQOPT package to do the estimation and the 
likelihood function is well-behaved. Furthermore, the independence across trading days 
was tested and it failed to be rejected.  
Based on those estimated parameters which are the “primitives” underlying the 
market-maker’s learning and pricing problem, Easley et al. (1997) describe a technique to 
estimate the probability of information-based trading (PIN) as 
sb
PIN εεαμ
αμ
++=                                                                                            (2.3) 
This helps illustrate how the quotes and spreads are affected and how asymmetric 
information affects market behaviour. The economic use of these parameters was demon-
strated successfully in Easley et al. (1997), Easley et al. (1998), Easley et al. (2001) and 
Easley, Hvidkjaer and O'Hara (2002).  
Easley et al. (1997) incorporated trade size into the model as an extension. Denot-
ing ϕ as the probability that an uninformed trader chooses to trade a large amount and ω 
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as the probability that an informed trader trades the large trade size, a more complex 
structure can be analyzed and estimated. Unfortunately, the likelihood statistics for the 
two models are almost identical, which suggests that trade size provides no additional 
information content. This is consistent with the findings mentioned above.  
In Easley et al. (1998), the probability of information-based trading was estimated 
for two groups of stocks that differ in analyst coverage, i.e. high and low analyst follow-
ing. Looking at the estimated parameters, the probability of a private information event, 
α, showed no statistical difference, thus the hypothesis that financial analysts discover 
information that otherwise would never become private information and make it possible 
for their clients to trade on this information to raise the probability of a private informa-
tion event, is not supported. However analyst coverage does matter in the composition of 
trade where stocks with high analyst following have both higher rates of informed and 
uninformed trading. This is consistent with the notion that at least some clients of ana-
lysts act as uninformed traders. However, the probabilities of informed trading PIN for 
stocks with high and low analyst following are not different at the 0.05 significance level, 
demonstrating that the number of analysts is not a good proxy for information-based 
trade, although the estimated probability of informed trading does have significant ex-
planatory power with respect to actual spread behaviour.  
Easley et al. (2001) extend this empirical technique to examine the different hy-
potheses about stock splits. The estimated parameter from the model facilitated the inves-
tigation at the effects of stock splits----the changes in the trading strategies of investors 
and in the information environment of stocks. They assume that uninformed traders can 
use either market or limit orders but informed traders only use market orders, with γb and 
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γs as the fraction of uninformed limit buy and sell orders. In this case the probability of 
informed trading is  
)1()1( ssbb
PIN γεγεαμ
αμ
−+−+=                                                                     (2.4) 
In a general case where εb ≠ εs and δ ≠ 0.5, they supported the trading range hy-
pothesis, which predicts an increase in uninformed trade when stocks split by showing 
that the mean percentage change of trading rate of uninformed buyers εb is highly statisti-
cally significant. However the information asymmetry hypothesis was not supported be-
cause the probability of informed trading (PIN), which represents the extent of the ad-
verse selection problem, did not show a significant decrease as predicted.  
Easley et al. (2002) investigated the role of information-based trading in affecting 
asset returns by incorporating the PIN estimated from the data of NYSE stocks from 1983 
to 1998 into a Fama and French (1992) asset-pricing framework. The model they used 
was simplified by assuming the uninformed are equally likely to buy and sell (εb = εs) and 
news is equally likely to be good or bad (δ = 0.5). Their results showed that information 
does affect asset prices, with a difference of 10 percentage points in PIN resulting in a 2.5 
percent difference for expected annual returns. They rationalise this finding as follows: 
“in a world with asymmetric information, an uninformed investor is always at a disadvan-
tage relative to traders with better information…Holding many stocks cannot remove this 
effect … In this sense, asymmetric information risk is systematic because, like market 
risk, it cannot be diversified away”. 
The success of this information-based trading model supports the study’s validity 
in this thesis.  
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2. 2 ASYMMETRY IN BID AND ASK PRICES 
A large part of market microstructure research builds on the notion that new in-
formation that is conveyed by trades will cause revision of market quotes, where bid and 
ask quotes are usually modeled as the result of adding a premium and subtracting a dis-
count to the efficient price (Glosten, 1987). The assumption that the bid and ask quotes 
are posted symmetrically around the efficient price is adopted by most of the models 
about price formation. For example, in Huang and Stoll’s (1997) model, the transitory 
components of bid and ask prices are treated as constant and equally-sized; in Glosten 
and Harris’s (1988) model, the dynamics of bid and ask are characterized by the same 
stochastic process. Besides, bid and ask quotes are sometimes assumed to respond to a 
shock simultaneously upward or downward, and by the same amount (e.g. Golsten and 
Milgrom 1985); or like Easley and O’Hara (1992), an assumption that whether a trade is 
buyer-initiated or seller-initiated is equally informative is used for modeling, believing 
that buys and sells only determine the direction, but not the magnitude of bid and ask re-
vision.  
If the assumption in the model is that the buys and sells are equally likely, the re-
sult that the premium added and the discount subtracted is symmetrical follows. So “sym-
metry assumption” of bid and ask, as called by Escribano and Pascual (2006), is reason-
able enough in that case. However, it is not always the case that the buys and sells are 
equally likely. For example, on a day where analysts make a “buy” recommendation, 
more buy orders than sell orders may be expected. To neutralize the expected profit, mar-
ket makers are quite likely to give a different premium and discount, because a small 
premium and large trading will balance a large discount and small trading.  
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This “symmetry assumption” has been challenged in several studies. Kavajecz 
(1999) argued that to make themselves immune to adverse selection cost, the specialists’ 
quotes reflect the interest on the limit order book, and only on the side (or sides) of the 
limit order book where they believe there is a chance of informed trading. That is to say, 
the specialist is selectively providing liquidity and selectively protecting himself from the 
market. Hasbrouck (1999) pointed out the assumption that the quote exposure cost is the 
same on both the bid and ask sides is reasonable only if the same quote-setter is active on 
both sides of the market, and the quotes are not sensitive to current inventory positions. 
However, in most stock exchanges, as is the case of the NYSE, quotes reflect the interests 
of several traders. Since different agents may be subject to different trading costs and dif-
ferent individual limit order traders, the offer and demand components of the spread may 
vary asymmetrically about the efficient price. He captured this by a model suggesting that 
bid and ask quotes arise from two independent processes: an implicit efficient price and 
quote exposure (market making) costs. Both components are continuous random vari-
ables where the implicit efficient price follows ARCH dynamics and the quote exposure 
costs are autoregressive. The filtered maximum likelihood estimation of the model 
showed that while both bid and ask quotes drop and the spread widens, the quote-
exposure cost on the bid and ask sides change asymmetrically. The bulk of spread in-
crease attributes to the bid-side. That is, the implicit efficient price does not track the 
midpoint of the bid and ask quotes. Instead it lies above the quote midpoint after the drop, 
which means that the rounding transformation generating the discrete bid and ask quotes 
is asymmetric.  
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Biais et al. (1995) shows that asymmetries between bid and ask quotes are not ex-
clusive of the NYSE. The Paris Bourse, a pure order-driven market, also shows an 
asymmetric bid-ask adjustment. These authors conclude that “there is additional informa-
tion in analyzing the dynamics of bid and ask prices jointly rather than averaging them 
through the quote midpoint”.  
The asymmetry has another aspect: the price impact of a buyer-initiated trade is 
not equivalent to that of seller-initiated trade. Holthausen et al. (1987) documented the 
effects of large (block) transactions on the prices of common stocks traded on the New 
York Stock Exchange. The results suggested that for seller-initiated transactions, price 
effects are predominantly temporary, however for buyer-initiated transactions, price ef-
fects are permanent. They hypothesize that large sales are less likely to contain informa-
tion because they are more likely to be liquidity motivated. Koski and Michaely (2000) 
showed that price and liquidity effects are significantly associated with information con-
tent and timing of trades, but the results are stronger for purchases than sales. Lakonishok 
and Lee (2001), when examining insider trading activities, showed that insiders are able 
to predict market movements better. However, the information content of insiders’ activi-
ties comes from purchases, while insider selling appears to have no predictive ability. 
This documented asymmetry that buyer-initiated trades are usually found to be more in-
formative than seller-initiated trades is consistent with the practice of restrictions on short 
selling, confirming that those restrictions prevent insiders from exploiting negative in-
formation. Besides, it also helps the explanation that the choice of selling a particular 
stock out of the numerous possibilities conveys more favourable information than selling 
one stock from a particular individual-held portfolio. 
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Escribano and Pascual (2006) extended the vector autoregressive (VAR) model 
introduced by Hasbrouck (1991) and jointly model the trading process and the revisions 
of market quotes. Hasbrouck builds on a “weak symmetry assumption” that the quote 
midpoint must revert to the efficient price as the end of trading approaches and concluded 
that the bid and ask prices may not be symmetrically posted around the efficient price, 
however, the expected impact of a buyer-initiated shock is exactly reverse of a seller-
initiated shock. Escribano and Pascual (2006) generalised the bivariate VAR model by a 
vector error correction (VEC) model with four dependent variables: changes in the ask 
price, changes in the bid price; buyer-initiated trades, and seller-initiated trades. Using 
the NYSE samples, they reported that bid and ask quotes do not respond symmetrically 
after trade-related shocks: they tend to be revised in the same direction, but not by the 
same amount; and average long-term impact of a buyer-initiated trade on the ask quote is 
larger than the average long-term impact of a similar seller-initiated trade on the bid 
quote, supporting the idea that buyer-initiated trades are more informative than seller-
initiated trades.  
2.3 INFORMED AND UNINFORMED TRADERS 
Market microstructure theory is characterised by the co-existence of both the in-
formed and the uninformed trader. This observation is credited to Bagehot (1971), who 
noted that there is a distinction in the market between market gains and trading gains, and 
that trading losses encountered by average investors arise because of the presence of 
some traders who have superior information. Copeland and Galai (1983) formalized the 
concept of information costs by their model, which was extended by Glosten and Mil-
grom (1985) and others. Here in this paper, as usual, informed traders refer to those trad-
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ers who know more about the future movement of prices than other traders. For example, 
an officer of a corporation or others who have access to private information about the 
corporation.7 
2.3.1 FINANCIAL ANALYSTS AND INFORMED TRADERS 
Financial analysts have been employed as a direct proxy for informed traders in a 
number of studies. In Glosten and Milgrom (1985), individuals who are particularly skil-
ful in processing public information (financial analysts) are regarded as informed traders. 
There are more examples in empirical studies: Skinner (1990) used analyst following as a 
proxy for the level of private information being produced. Brennan et al. (1993) regarded 
the number of analysts as a proxy for the number of informed investors in their empirical 
study on the prediction from Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) that as the number of 
informed investors increases, the share price will reflect new information more rapidly. 
Chung et al. (1995) suggested using the number of financial analysts as a proxy for in-
formation asymmetry and supported the notion that specialists and financial analysts 
make their decisions interactively: Specialists establish the bid-ask spread of a stock ac-
cording to the extent of information asymmetry (the number of financial analysts follow-
ing the stock) and more financial analysts will follow stocks with a greater spread.  
However, Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1995) investigated the allegation that if 
financial analysts are informed traders, then one might expect to find greater adverse se-
lection costs for the stocks with more financial analysts, corresponding to the increased 
risk that market makers face in trading with the informed. However, measuring the ad-
verse selection costs by the λ given by Kyle (1985), they find the opposite: firms with 
many analysts face a smaller adverse selection cost than do firms with fewer analysts. 
                                                 
7 This private information usually takes the form of signals about the firm’s project cash flows. 
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This is interpreted by Easley et al. (1998) to be “consistent with the notion that financial 
analysts are uninformed, or even misinformed, traders”. Further they used a trade-based 
empirical technique to estimate the probability of information-based trading for a sample 
of NYSE stocks that differ in analyst coverage, and found that the number of analysts is 
negatively related to the probability of information-based trading and the probability of 
private information events is the same for stocks with high or low analyst following. 
What they conclude is that financial analysts do not appear to create private information 
and they are not a good positive proxy for information-based trading. This is consistent 
with the idea that analyst recommendations are generally based on public information 
rather than private information, supported by the findings of Womack (1996) that only 24 
of 694 recommendations in the sample used private or new fact in their discussion.  
Besides, the situation for accessing private information has changed a lot for fi-
nancial analysts since October 23, 2000, the day the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) implemented Regulation Fair Disclosure. Reg FD prohibits selective disclo-
sure of material information about the companies to analysts and other investment profes-
sionals. Under the regulation, any intentional disclosure of material non-public informa-
tion by firms to analysts or other parties must be simultaneously released to the general 
public. Unintentional disclosures must be disclosed publicly within 24 hours. This means 
that the financial analysts would have no better information than that available to all in-
vestors. Empirical support from Gintschel and Markov (2004) showed that in the post-
Regulation FD period, the absolute price impact of information disseminated by financial 
analysts is lower by 28% than in the pre-Reg FD period, confirming the goal of Reg FD 
to curtail the flow of private information to financial analysts.  
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As the information available to financial analysts may differ from that of in-
formed insiders, doubt from investors and specialists about their stock recommendation 
accuracy seems totally natural and inevitable.  
2.3.2 MARKET MAKER AND INFORMED TRADER 
In those information models, an implicit assumption is that the market maker is 
uninformed. Remember that in a Bayesian learning model, the market maker does not 
know what the “true” value of the asset is, and thus is the same as other uninformed trad-
ers in this respect. Madhavan and Panchapagesan (2000) supported the reasonableness of 
this assumption with two pieces of evidence. One is that if market makers do have supe-
rior information, the relationship between changes in market maker inventory levels and 
subsequent price rises should be positive; however a negative relationship was found in 
studies of the NYSE and OTC markets. The other comes from studies showing that mar-
ket maker purchases tend to be followed by declines in the ask prices while sales are fol-
lowed by increases in bid prices, which is the opposite of what one would expect if mar-
ket makers were informed. So the assumption that the market maker is uninformed seems 
valid.  
2.4 INFORMATION CONTENT OF ANALYST RECOMMENDA-
TIONS  
Although analyst recommendations are not based on private information, they do 
provide information to the market. Womack (1996) concluded that the recommendations 
embody valuable information, even though few recommendations coincide with new 
public news or provide previously unavailable facts (only 24 of 694 recommendations in 
the sample used private or new fact in their discussion). Using data from First Call, the 
31 
author found significant initial price and volume reactions to recommendation changes 
(added-to-buy, removed-from-buy, added-to-sell and removed-from-sell), both at the 
three-day event window and in months before and after the event. On average, size-
adjusted prices increase 3.0 percent for buy recommendations and drop 4.7 percent for 
sell recommendations. There is also significant post-recommendation drift associated 
with buy recommendations with an incremental mean size-adjusted return of +2.4 percent 
for the first post-event month beginning two days after the recorded date of the recom-
mendation. Sell recommendations are associated with post-recommendation drift of –9.1 
percent over a longer six-month post-event period. Before the removal of buy and sell 
recommendations, excess returns are in a direction consistent with the recommendations 
that were in place before the recommendation removal. Hence Womack (1996) concludes 
that analysts have market timing and stock picking abilities.  
 This finding about abnormal returns for recommendation change events is consis-
tent with the previous literature. Elton et al. (1986) showed that excess returns are found 
in the month during which there is a change in the brokerage firm recommendations, as 
well as during the next two months. An approximate 4.5% extra return can be earned by 
purchasing new buys rather than new sells. Stickel (1995) found an extra return of +1.16 
percent and –1.28 percent for an 11-day event window.  
Individual recommendations such as the Value Line Investment Survey or the 
“Dartboard” column8 published by the Wall Street Journal have documented similar re-
                                                 
8 The “Dartboard” column is published monthly in the Wall Street Journal. In this column, four investment 
analysts recommend one stock each, called “Pros’ Picks”. The Journal compared the performance of these 
four stocks to the performance of four securities that are randomly selected (by the throw of a dart by Jour-
nal staff), the “Dartboard Stocks”.  On average, the stocks recommended for the “Dartboard” column are 
smaller in capitalization and higher in volatility than the stocks recommended by the major U.S. brokerage 
firms.  
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sults. Stickel (1985) finds abnormal event-period returns of +2.4 percent for firms added 
to Value Line rank 1 (the highest rank, a buy recommendation) and –0.3 percent for firms 
added to rank 5 (the lowest rank, a sell recommendation). Davies and Canes (1978) ex-
amined the effect on market prices of the publication of analysts’ recommendations in the 
Wall Street Journal column “Heard on the Street”, and documented an abnormal return of 
0.923 percent on the day9 a stock receives a favourable mention in the column and a 
negative return of –2.374 percent if the stock receives an unfavourable mention. Beneish 
(1991), although arguing against the secondary reporting of analysts’ recommendations 
affecting stock prices as stated by Davies and Canes (1978), did confirm the significant 
average abnormal stock return performance, not only on the day of publication, but also 
on the preceding two trading days. Barber and Loeffler (1993) analyzed the price and 
volume effect of analysts’ recommendations published in the “Dartboard” column of the 
Wall Street Journal. Average positive abnormal returns of 4 percent and doubled average 
normal volume levels are documented for the two days following publication of the rec-
ommendations. However the positive abnormal return is partially reversed within 25 trad-
ing days, reflecting a naïve buying pressure as well as the information content of the ana-
lysts’ recommendations.  
Most recently, in the examination of the market reaction to an insider trading case 
that involved five stockbrokers who had advance copies of a stock analysis column 
named “Inside Wall Street” (IWS)10 in Business Week magazine the day before its public 
release, Fishe and Robe (2004) reported an average abnormal return of 4.75 percent one 
                                                 
9 The Wall Street Journal is a morning newspaper which is available to investors prior to the opening of 
trading.  
10 This Business Week scheme started in June 1995 and ended with the February 5, 1996 issue. 
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day after the publication before the illegal inside trading period11 and 5.38 percent cumu-
lative abnormal return in the two days before and after the publication12 (and 3.87 percent 
one day after the publication) after that period. All are statistically significant at the 99% 
level of confidence, giving support once again that analyst recommendations are regarded 
as informative by the market.  
                                                 
11 That is between June 5, 1995 and January 29, 1996. 
 
12 The column is publicly released after the close on Thursday, leaving Friday as the day after the release 
and Thursday as the day before the release.  
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
This chapter is designed to explain the methodology and introduce the data used 
in deriving the results. Section 1 explains the model and the methodology on trade direc-
tion classification, maximum likelihood estimation, test technique and probability of in-
formation-based trading. The hypotheses are discussed as well. Section 2 describes the 
sample selection and data.  
3.1 METHODOLOGY 
Specialists are the middlemen in the market operation of exchanges like the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and American Stock Exchange (AMEX). Glosten and 
Milgrom (1985) propose the following model for bid and ask prices set by the specialists: 
[ ]tttt aZSVEa >= , ,  
[ ]tttt bZSVEb <= , ,                                                                                          (3.1) 
where St is the information available to the specialist at time t, and {Zt > a} refers to the 
event that the investor makes a purchase and {Zt < b} refers to the event that the investor 
makes a sale.  
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If the true value of the stock only has two possible outcomes, either low ( dV ) or 
high ( uV ), then (3.1) can be simplified as follows, 
}Pr{}Pr{][ tuutddtt BVVVBVVVBvEa =+=== , 
}Pr{}Pr{][ tuutddtt SVVVSVVVSvEb =+=== ,                                          (1.1) 
which we’ve discussed in Chapter 1. Because of the learning process, this sequential trad-
ing model allows the adjustment of prices to information to be analyzed on a trade-by-
trade basis.  
In the spirit of Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Easley and O’Hara (1992) gave a 
structural model based on the sequential trade tree diagram shown in Figure 1. Induced 
by this model, the likelihood function for a single trading day is 
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where ),,,,( μεεδαθ sb= is the parameter vector. And the likelihood of observing the 
data Iiii SBM 1),( == over I trading days is just the product of the daily likelihood function,  
),(),(
1
ii
I
i
SBLSBL ∏
=
= θθ                                                                                  (2.2) 
where ),( ii SB is trade data for day i=1,…, I.  
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With this model, we can work backwards from observing a particular sequence of 
trades to discover information about the underlying structural parameters. To facilitate 
calculation, maximizing (2.2) is equivalent to maximizing its log-likelihood form: 
),(ln),(ln
1
ii
I
i
SBLSBL ∑
=
= θθ .                                                                             (3.2) 
By maximizing (3.2) over θ which includes μεεδα ,,,, sb , using the data set M, 
we are able to determine estimates for the underlying structural parameters of the model. 
In fact, the model interprets the normal level of buys and sells for a stock as uninformed 
trade to identify εb and εs. Abnormal buy or sell volume is interpreted as information-
based trade, used to identify µ. The number of days in which there is abnormal buy or sell 
volume is used to identify α and δ. However, the maximum likelihood actually does all of 
this simultaneously. 
The dataset M is a group of data on the number of buy- and sell- initiated trades 
per day. Although how many buys and how many sells in each trading day are not avail-
able immediately from any databases, the availability of intraday trade and quote data, 
which can be attributed to the automation of stock markets, has opened the possibility of 
determining the trade direction.  
3.1.1 TRADE DIRECTION CLASSIFICATION 
 There are three trade classification algorithms extensively used in microstructure 
studies, the quote rule, the tick rule, and Lee and Ready’s (1991) rule (LR rule hereaf-
ter).13 
                                                 
13 For the derivation of these approaches, see Hasbrouck (1988), Blume et al. (1989), and Lee and Ready 
(1991).  
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A. Quote Rule 
The quote rule classifies a transaction as a buy if the trade price is above the mid-
point of the bid and ask quote; or as a sell if the trade price is below the midpoint. Those 
transactions traded at the midpoint are not classified.  
B. Tick Rule 
The tick rule classifies a trade based on price movements relative to previous 
trades. If the trade price is above the previous price, then it is an uptick. If there is no 
price change but the previous trade is an uptick, then this trade is classified as a zero-
uptick. Both upticks and zero-upticks are classified as buys.  
The tick rule has been used when quote data are not available. In theory all trades 
can be classified as either a buy or a sell order by using a tick rule. However as Lee and 
Ready (1991) said: “The primary limitation of the tick rule is its relative imprecision 
when compared to a quote-based approach, particularly if the prevailing quote has 
changed or it has been a long time since the last trade.”  
C. Lee and Ready’s (1991) Rule 
LR’s procedure is essentially a combination of the quote rule and tick rule. First, 
classify a trade according to the quote rule (above or below the midpoint), and then clas-
sify those transactions at midpoint using the tick rule. Given the reporting procedure on 
the NYSE, LR also suggest comparing transaction prices to quotes reported at least five 
seconds before the transaction was reported.  
Although it is not easy to determine how well these algorithms work because of 
the limitation on the source of the original order, some empirical tests do provide evi-
dence on the validity of trade classification algorithms. Using NYSE data, Odders-White 
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(2000) reported an agreement rate of 85% between the actual order and LR’s algorithmic 
inference. Finucane (2000) concludes that for NYSE firms, the tick test and LR method 
have very similar performance accuracy. However, Ellis et al. (2000) used a NASDAQ 
proprietary data set that identifies trade direction and found the quote rule, the tick rule, 
and the LR rule correctly classify 76.4%, 77.66%, and 81.05% of the trades respectively. 
Based on these results, we will follow the LR rule in this paper. 
3.1.2 MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATION 
The basic idea of maximum likelihood estimation is, as the name implies, to find 
a set of parameter estimates, ),,,,( μεεδαθ sb= in our case, such that the likelihood of 
having obtained the actual observed sample is maximized. The likelihood function is the 
joint density of the observations ),( ii SB . For any given ),,,,( μεεδαθ sb= , this function 
tells us how likely we were to have observed the sample Iiii SBM 1),( == . Then the joint 
probability density for the model being estimated is evaluated at the observed values of 
the dependent variables ),( ii SB and treated as a function of the model parameters. The 
vector of ML estimates θˆ  yields the maximum of this function.  
Computer software typically provides accurate values for a Poisson probability to 
approximately 10–16. If the true probability is smaller than this, then it is assigned a value 
of zero. This causes difficulty in determining maximum likelihood since if one observa-
tion turns out to have a probability reported as zero, then the product must also be zero 
(and the logarithm must be negative infinity, which also reports as an error). On the other 
hand, software typically provides accurate values for a normal probability to approxi-
mately 10–308. Since the computer software could not give the joint density to Poisson 
distribution as accurately as to normal distribution, we use the normal limit of the Poisson 
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distribution as an approximation: For large parameter values, the Poisson distribution ap-
proaches the normal distribution, (Haight 1967). Let Xλ be a Poisson distributed variable 
with parameters λ, and let Yλ be a normal random variable with mean and variance λ. 
Then Pr{Xλ ≤ z} → Pr{Yλ ≤ z} as λ → ∞ uniformly in z. This approximation is very ac-
curate for large values λ > 1000, but for smaller values it is appropriate to apply a correc-
tion to account for using a continuous distribution to approximate a discrete distribution. 
Since Pr{Xλ ≤ z} = Pr{Xλ ≤ z + c} for any constant 0 ≤ c < 1, Pr{Xλ ≤ z} → Pr{Yλ ≤ z + c} 
as λ → ∞ uniformly in z. A natural choice for the constant is the midpoint c = 0.5. This 
approximation, Pr{Xλ ≤ z} ≈ Pr{Yλ ≤ z + 0.5}, is quite accurate for λ > 10,14 and since 
this represents the average number of buys and sells each day, and the minimum number 
of trades among all of the days and stocks that we examine is 42, so the average easily 
meets this requirement.  
Another problem with the maximum likelihood estimation is the restrictions of 
the parameters. Both α and δ are probabilities, so they should be restricted between 0 and 
1 inclusive. And εb, εs, and µ are the arrival rates of different traders, so they should all be 
non-negative. We estimate increasing transformations of the parameters es = ln(εs), and   
a = tan{π(α + 0.5)}, etc. In this case the transformed parameters es, a, etc. are estimated 
without constraints, and by the invariance of maximum likelihood estimators, we can find 
the maximum likelihood estimates of our original parameters by applying the appropriate 
inverse functions. 
                                                 
14 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poisson_distribution 
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3.1.3 HYPOTHESES AND TEST TECHNIQUE 
As we discussed before, it is hard to say whether analysts genuinely contribute 
new information about the value of the stock being analysed, because analysts typically 
do not have more information than the market when making their forecasts. However 
they may be able to better interpret this available information due to their expertise and 
thus value the stock more accurately than the market. Furthermore, investors may or may 
not follow the analyst’s advice, (i.e. they may or may not believe that the analyst is able 
to interpret information better than the market). This gives four possible events: (1) Ana-
lysts make accurate recommendations and investors believe them, (2) Analysts make in-
accurate recommendations, but investors believe them to be accurate, (3) Analysts make 
accurate recommendations, but investors don’t believe them, and (4) Analysts make inac-
curate recommendations, and investors correctly believe these recommendations to be 
inaccurate.  
To distinguish between these four possible events, we bring a third class of trader 
into consideration, which we call analyst followers, who base their trades on analysts’ 
recommendations. Then we separate the whole test period into three sets: the dates when 
there is no change in analysts’ recommendation (called the no-recommendation period 
hereafter), the dates when there is positive change in analysts’ recommendation such as 
going from sell to hold recommendations (up-recommendation period), and the dates 
when there is negative change in analysts’ recommendations (down-recommendation pe-
riod). In the maximum likelihood estimation, we use two dummy variables to identify the 
three periods: one equals to 1 in the up-recommendation period and 0 otherwise, and the 
other equals to 1 in the down-recommendation period and 0 otherwise. Thus we estimate 
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),,,,( μεεδαθ sb=  for each period and check whether the parameters are significantly 
different in different periods. 
The technique we use to test the hypothesis whether there are significant changes 
for the parameters in different periods is the likelihood ratio test. Let θ be a vector of pa-
rameters to be estimated, and now we can specify some sort of restriction on the parame-
ters (e.g. H0: α in the up-recommendation period equals to α in the no-recommendation 
period). Let Uθˆ  be the maximum likelihood estimator of θ obtained without the con-
straints, and let Rθˆ  be the constrained maximum likelihood estimator. If ULˆ and RLˆ are 
the likelihood functions evaluated at these two estimates, then the likelihood ratio is  
U
R
L
L
ˆ
ˆ=λ ,                                                                                                          (3.3) 
which must be between zero and one. The likelihood ratio test statistic works as follows: 
Under regularity and under H0, the large sample distribution of –2lnλ is chi-squared, with 
degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions imposed (Greene, 2003). So if the 
value of –2lnλ exceeds the appropriate critical value from the chi-squared table, the null 
hypothesis (or the restriction) will be rejected, supporting the significant difference of the 
parameter in two different periods.  
If we find a different α, which is the probability of new information, for days with 
recommendation changes, compared to no-recommendation days, we may conclude that 
financial analysts can cause the probability of private information events occurring to 
change by announcing their recommendation, where we define a private information 
event as the occurrence of a signal that is not publicly observable about the future value 
of the asset. If a higher α is found in up- and/or down-recommendation periods (in this 
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case, the analyst followers shall be regarded as informed traders), it may be taken as a 
support that financial analysts can discover some information that otherwise would not 
have become private information, and make it possible for their clients to trade on this 
information. If a lower α is found, we may say that analysts have the capacity to accu-
rately understand, interpret and effectively make a piece of information publicly available 
that would otherwise be private. Or it may be that analysts are good at predicting when 
information will arise and therefore choose to release recommendations more frequently 
on days when information events occur. In this case they don’t actually affect the prob-
ability directly, but a change in α would be associated with recommendations rather than 
be caused by them. Since we are not sure whether or not financial analysts affect the 
probability of private information events, we leave it as an empirical question. 
Since the probability that new information is bad news, δ, is conditioned on the 
occurrence of private information events, the change of α, no matter how, would make it 
hard for us to interpret δ independently. So we use the unconditional probability γ = α × δ, 
which is the probability of a “bad-news days”, and β = α × (1– δ), which is the probabil-
ity of a “good-news days” instead.15 If analysts have forecast ability on the occurrence of 
information events and can effectively time their recommendations to coincide, we may 
expect to see a higher probability of “good-news day” or a lower probability of “bad-
news day” (both are positive pieces of information) on days when they increase their rec-
ommendations, i.e. in the up-recommendation period. In the down-recommendation pe-
riod, a higher γ or a lower β also supports the accuracy of financial analysts. 
While changes in the parameters α and δ are associated with accuracy of the ana-
lysts’ recommendations, the other three parameters relate to trader composition which is 
                                                 
15 This is consistent with the three possible events given in Figure 1. 
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associated with the market response to the analysts’ recommendation: εb and εs are the 
arrival rates of uninformed sellers and buyers; μ is the arrival rate of informed traders. 
Changes in these parameters allow inference about how market participants respond to 
recommendations. We check whether the trader composition is different in recommenda-
tion and no-recommendation periods and how they differ. [As we discussed above, we 
can consider the analyst followers as informed traders if and only if the analysts are able 
to forecast information events (an increase of α, or an appropriate change in β, or γ), oth-
erwise, the analyst followers should be regarded as uninformed traders.] That is to say, if 
in the up-recommendation periods, the buyers’ arrival rates increase significantly, or if in 
the down-recommendation period, the sellers’ arrival rates increase, then we can draw the 
conclusion that investors typically believe analysts, i.e. Events (1) and (2). On the other 
hand, if in the up-recommendation period, buyer’s arrival rates do not change at all or 
even decrease, and similarly for sellers in the down-recommendation period, then this 
supports Events (3) and (4) where investors do not believe analysts. They may even act 
against the analysts’ recommendation. It could be that an asymmetric response between 
up- and down-recommendation periods is observed. This may support credibility of one 
form of recommendation change over the other. 
As to the arrival rate of informed traders, μ, we would take its change as the re-
sponse of existing informed traders to the analyst’s recommendation except the case 
when μ increases with the increase of α, which as we discussed above, shows that the 
analysts find out some private information so that their clients become “informed” traders. 
Since the informed traders could believe that analysts have worse information than they 
have, it is possible that they will trade more just to exploit opportunities. 
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3.1.4 PROBABILITY OF INFORMATION-BASED TRADING 
 
As we discussed above, specialists try to solve the adverse selection problem by 
giving rise to the bid-ask spread and they update the bid-ask spread according to their as-
sessment of the probability of information-based trading. Since it is possible that on those 
days when analysts announce their recommendations, the specialists might suspect that 
orders in the opposite direction of the analyst’s recommendation may be more likely to be 
made by informed traders, thus giving different conditional probabilities of informed 
trading in different situations. For example on days with up-recommendation changes, 
they may give a higher probability of information-based trading to a sell order compared 
to a buy order. If that’s the case, we may expect to see asymmetry between bid discounts 
and ask premiums. 
If the specialists do value the “lemons discount” and “peach premium” in an 
asymmetrical way, the midpoint price we observe from the market would not be the full-
information price. For example, they may give a larger discount for the bid price and a 
smaller premium for the ask price when the recommendation from financial analysts is 
“buy”, leading to a midpoint price that is lower than the full-information price (expected 
value of the stock). This would also be interpreted by the market as over optimism by fi-
nancial analysts, even though the analysts are accurate.  
Based on the unconditional probability of information-based trading (PIN) given 
by Easley et al. (1998),16 we work out the conditional probabilities, namely PIN|sell and 
                                                 
16 We uncovered a small error in the PIN formula given by Easley et al. (1998),
sb
PIN εεαμ
αμ
++= . 
Since conditioned on the occurrence of an information event, the probability that the waiting time for the 
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PIN|buy. Since in the model, all traders are supposed to arrive independently of each 
other and according to Poisson processes, the waiting times for the next uninformed 
buyer, uninformed seller and informed trader are independent and exponentially distrib-
uted with rates εb, εs, µ respectively. This implies that the minimum waiting time for any 
uninformed trader is exponentially distributed with rate εb + εs. Conditioned on the occur-
rence of an information event, the probability that the waiting time for the informed trad-
ers is less than the minimum waiting time for an uninformed trader is
sb εεμ
μ
++ . Since 
if an information event has not occurred, informed traders will not trade, this conditional 
probability is zero. Thus the unconditional probability that the next trader is informed is 
{ }{ } { } 0eventn InformatioPreventn informatio,minPr +×<= xb XXXPIN μ    
μεε
αμ
++= sb
                                                                                          (3.7) 
where Xb, Xs and Xμ represent the waiting times for next uninformed buyer, uninformed 
seller and informed trader respectively, and the probability of information event occur-
ring is α.  
Based on the observation that informed traders only sell if they have seen bad 
news, the probability of information-based trading conditioned on a sell (PIN|sell) would 
be { }{ }sellXXX sb ,minPr <μ  and equal to
sεμ
αδμ
+ . The derivation is as follows: 
                                                                                                                                                 
informed traders is less than the minimum waiting time for an uninformed trader is 
sb εεμ
μ
++ , and the 
probability of the occurrence of an information event is α, the unconditional probability that the next trader 
is informed is 
sb
PIN ε+ε+μ
αμ= . 
 
46 
 { }{ }sellXXX sb ,minPr <μ  
{ { } } { }newsbadnewsbadandsellXXX sb Pr,minPr ×<= μ  
{ } { }{ } { }newsbadnewsbadandXXXXXX bssb Pr,min,minPr ×<<= μμ  
{ } { }{ }
{ }{ } { }newsbadnewsbadXXX newsbadXXXandXXX bs bssb Pr,minPr
,min,minPr ×<
<<=
μ
μμ   
{ }{ }
{ }{ } { }newsbadnewsbadXXX newsbadXXX sb sb Pr,minPr1
,minPr ×<−
<=
μ
μ  
αδ
εεμ
ε
εεμ
μ
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
++−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
++=
bs
b
bs
1
 
sεμ
αδμ
+=  
Similarly, the probability of information-based trading conditioned on a buy 
is
b
buyPIN ε+μ
μδ−α= )1(| . 
Our hypothesis about the information-based trading is: if the analysts’ recommen-
dations are associated with information events, we would see a high PIN in recommenda-
tion periods; if specialists know that uninformed investors on average believe analysts, on 
recommendation days there would be an increase of trading in the direction of the rec-
ommendation, and orders in the opposite direction of recommendation are more likely to 
be an information-based trade (given that specialists believe the analysts have no private 
information so the analyst followers are still “uninformed”), they would give a higher 
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PIN|sell and a lower PIN|buy in the up-recommendation period, and lower PIN|sell and 
higher PIN|buy in the down-recommendation period. 
From a modeling perspective, we adjust the basic model by considering a separate 
game tree (i.e. Figure 1) applied for each sub-period we consider. This causes our trader 
arrival processes to be conditionally independent Poisson, and the parameters to be con-
ditional probabilities and means, conditioned on the type of recommendation change. 
Therefore, if any of these parameters are affected systematically by analyst recommenda-
tion changes (as some of them are), this doesn’t compromise the independence required 
for estimation or for calculating PIN, etc. 
3.2 SAMPLE SELECTION AND THE DATA 
This study spans a two-year period from January 1, 2001 to December 31, 2002. 
The two databases used are IBES and TAQ2.  
IBES, the Institutional Brokers Estimate System, gathers and compiles the differ-
ent earnings estimates of over 18,000 companies in 60 countries. More than 850 firms 
contribute data to I/B/E/S, from the largest global houses to regional and local brokers, 
with US data back to 1976 and international data back to 1987. The IBES is a quality 
source for analysts’ forecast data, research reports, tools, and applied intelligence, 
whereby investors and researchers are able to examine the different analyst estimates for 
any given stock without necessarily searching for each individual analyst. As William 
Sharpe, Nobel Laureate says in his classic text Investments, "While I/B/E/S is not the 
only company collecting earnings expectations data...it was the first and remains the 
leader in the field.”  
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For sample selection, all recommendations for the U.S. listed stocks are retrieved 
for two years from January 2001 to December 2002, giving 78,424 non-missing observa-
tions in total with five consensus recommendation categories from 1 to 5 representing 
strong buy, buy, hold, sell and strong sell respectively. Following previous research, only 
the days with changes in recommendations will be regarded as event days. If the average 
recommendation is less than the average in the previous day, then we consider it an up-
recommendation to the market on that day; if the average recommendation is greater than 
the previous day average, then we treat it as a down-recommendation to the market on 
that day. Thus we figure out the information event days of each firm. The top thirty firms 
listed in NYSE and AMEX (since we focus on the specialist market) with the most in-
formation event days go into our sample. The list of the thirty firms is given in Table 1. 
They cover 15 different industry classification codes and the total assets at the end of 
year 2002 vary from 2,548 million dollars to 167,468 million dollars.  
The ticker data are retrieved from the Trade and Quote (TAQ) database. The 
TAQ2 database contains intraday transactions data (trades and quotes) for all securities 
listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX), 
NASDAQ, and National Market System (NMS) since 1993. Based on the ticker data, we 
classified the trades into buy and sell using the LR algorithm, thus transforming them into 
daily numbers of buys and sells. Then we divided the whole data of each firm into three 
groups: no-recommendation period, up-recommendation period and down-
recommendation period. While doing this, one problem we encounter is that some of the 
analysts’ recommendations came to the market on non-business days. In that case, if 
there is no other information coming to the market around that day, then the following 
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business days are treated as the event day. If there are conflicting information events 
around that day, then we ignore both days from both the non-information period and the 
information period. We do this because we can not classify the information set and we try 
to avoid the unnecessary noise. This may lead to one or two less observation in these 
three groups than in the whole group.  
Table 2 provides the statistics of the daily numbers of buys and sells. Panel A re-
ports the summary statistics across the thirty firms and Panel B reports the details for 
each firm in different periods. For the two-year period, there are 494 observations in total. 
The mean of daily buys over the two-year period for each firm ranges from 274 to 1589, 
and the mean of daily sells for each firm ranges from 213 to 1477. This results in the 
mean of daily trades (the sum of buys and sells) ranging from 487 to 3065, which shows 
great diversity although all thirty firms are relatively actively traded. In the up-
recommendation period, we have 21 to 36 observations (days), 20 to 38 observations in 
the down-recommendation period, and 419 to 451 observations in the no-
recommendation period. In the no-recommendation period, the mean of daily buys across 
the thirty firms range from 267 to 1581; in the up-recommendation period, the means 
range from 343 to 1681; in the down-recommendation period, the means range from 330 
to 1716. The mean of daily sells range from 208 to 1474 in the no-recommendation pe-
riod, from 273 to 1569 in the up-recommendation period and from 249-1502 in the down-
recommendation period. As we can see, the average number of trades (both buys and 
sells) is generally greater in either recommendation period than in the no-
recommendation period. This suggests that the market as a whole does respond to ana-
lysts’ recommendations in some way. 
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Table 1 
The list of firms 
Ticker Name of Company Industry NAICS1 Total Asset
2 
(million $) 
AOL/TWX3 TIME WARNER INC MOTION PIC, VIDEOTAPE PRODTN 512110 115,450 
APC ANADARKO PETROLEUM CORP CRUDE PETROLEUM & NATURAL GS 211111 18,248 
AT ALLTEL CORP RADIOTELEPHONE COMMUNICATION 517212 16,389 
AWE AT&T WIRELESS SERVICES INC RADIOTELEPHONE COMMUNICATION 517212 45,806 
BP BP PLC -ADR PETROLEUM REFINING 324110 159,125 
BR BURLINGTON RESOURCES INC CRUDE PETROLEUM & NATURAL GS 211111 10,645 
BSX BOSTON SCIENTIFIC CORP SURGICAL,MED INSTR,APPARATUS 339112 4,450 
CC CIRCUIT CITY STORES INC RADIO,TV,CONS ELECTR STORES 443112 3,799 
COF CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORP PERSONAL CREDIT INSTITUTIONS 522210 37,382 
DNA GENENTECH INC PHARMACEUTICAL PREPARATIONS 325412 6,777 
DVN DEVON ENERGY CORP CRUDE PETROLEUM & NATURAL GS 211111 16,225 
EDS ELECTRONIC DATA SYSTEMS CORP 
CMP PROGRAMMING,DATA PROC-
ESS 541513 18,880 
EOG EOG RESOURCES INC CRUDE PETROLEUM & NATURAL GS 211111 3,814 
GDT GUIDANT CORP SURGICAL,MED INSTR,APPARATUS 339112 3,716 
GPS GAP INC FAMILY CLOTHING STORES 448140 9,902 
JBL JABIL CIRCUIT INC PRINTED CIRCUIT BOARDS 334412 2,548 
LU LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES INC CMP INTEGRATED SYS DESIGN 541512 17,791 
MOT MOTOROLA INC RADIO,TV BROADCAST, COMM EQ 334220 31,152 
MRK MERCK & CO PHARMACEUTICAL PREPARATIONS 325412 47,561 
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Table 1 (Cont’d)  
The list of firms 
Ticker Name of Company Industry Industry Classification Code 
Total Asset* 
(million $) 
NOK NOKIA CORP -ADR RADIO,TV BROADCAST, COMM EQ 334220 24,458 
PCS SPRINT PCS GROUP RADIOTELEPHONE COMMUNICATION 517212 23,022 
Q QWEST COMMUNICATION INTL INC PHONE COMM EX RADIOTELEPHONE 517110 29,345 
RD ROYAL DUTCH PETROLEUM -ADR PETROLEUM REFINING 324110 91,615 
RIG TRANSOCEAN INC DRILLING OIL AND GAS WELLS 213111 12,665 
SAP SAP AG -ADR PREPACKAGED SOFTWARE 511210 5,882 
SBC SBC COMMUNICATIONS INC PHONE COMM EX RADIOTELEPHONE 517110 95,057 
SGP SCHERING-PLOUGH PHARMACEUTICAL PREPARATIONS 325412 14,136 
SLR SOLECTRON CORP PRINTED CIRCUIT BOARDS 334412 11,014 
T AT&T CORP PHONE COMM EX RADIOTELEPHONE 517110 55,272 
VZ VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS INC PHONE COMM EX RADIOTELEPHONE 517110 167,468 
1 North American Industry Classification System.  
2 At the end of year 2002. 
3 The ticker now changed from AOL to TWX. In the following tables, we either use AOL/TWX or use AOL', according to the situation. 
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Table 2 
Summary statistics for the daily numbers of buys and sells  
Panel A: Summary across thirty firms 
  
Number of Observa-
tion Mean of Buys Mean of  Sells 
Total  494 274-1589 213-1477 
no-recommendation period 419-451 267-1581 208-1474 
up-recommendation period 21-36 343-1681 273-1569 
down-recommendation period 20-38 330-1716 249-1502 
Panel B: Details for each firm 
Buy Sell Ticker Period Number of Observation min max mean min max mean
AOL'  494 607 2575 1589 482 2337 1477
No Recommendation 438 607 2575 1581 482 2337 1474
Up Recommendation 26 979 2354 1624 745 1978 1492  
Down Recommendation 29 951 2386 1658 636 2041 1492
APC  494 315 1795 1002 205 1687 803
No Recommendation 446 315 1679 996 242 1687 798
Up Recommendation 25 705 1319 1039 617 1208 844  
Down Recommendation 22 484 1795 1076 494 1101 865
AT  494 157 1343 582 98 1143 499
No Recommendation 446 157 1343 575 98 1106 491
Up Recommendation 24 302 987 626 235 963 537  
Down Recommendation 22 276 1223 675 241 1143 601
AWE  494 233 1751 879 158 1892 894
No Recommendation 433 233 1660 866 158 1892 875
Up Recommendation 30 358 1637 990 261 1539 1038  
Down Recommendation 31 346 1751 957 350 1655 1022
BP  494 203 1218 570 209 1015 493
No Recommendation 449 203 1218 567 209 1015 492
Up Recommendation 21 334 1164 586 270 927 501  
Down Recommendation 22 289 1003 600 216 954 505
BR  494 186 1393 653 153 1211 520
No Recommendation 440 186 1393 648 153 1211 520
Up Recommendation 27 319 1185 686 324 1112 513  
Down Recommendation 24 264 1235 704 226 893 536
BSX  494 87 1354 569 114 1488 479
No Recommendation 443 87 1254 556 114 1196 472
Up Recommendation 24 257 1354 680 230 1488 583  
Down Recommendation 26 255 1333 672 178 981 509
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Table 2 (cont’d) 
Summary statistics for the daily numbers of buys and sells 
 
Buy Sell Ticker Period Number of Observation min max mean min max mean
CC  494 158 1834 606 95 1452 480
No Recommendation 449 158 1428 587 95 1333 465
Up Recommendation 21 264 1834 827 190 1097 625  
Down Recommendation 22 185 1740 737 226 1452 630
COF  494 298 2318 1122 234 1992 879
No Recommendation 448 298 2318 1093 234 1789 859
Up Recommendation 24 536 2159 1358 458 1992 1078  
Down Recommendation 20 551 2024 1416 435 1600 1079
DNA  494 230 1640 706 154 1356 545
No Recommendation 445 321 1421 691 177 1087 537
Up Recommendation 22 550 1640 895 400 1356 651  
Down Recommendation 25 230 1555 804 154 852 588
DVN  494 184 1116 495 127 741 370
No Recommendation 437 184 1116 490 127 741 366
Up Recommendation 30 203 873 508 127 563 368  
Down Recommendation 27 238 770 559 181 718 437
EDS  494 260 1612 738 288 1424 637
No Recommendation 440 260 1612 721 288 1424 626
Up Recommendation 26 389 1496 905 409 1317 738  
Down Recommendation 28 426 1390 851 407 1306 723
EOG  494 147 1095 523 133 978 408
No Recommendation 443 147 1095 515 133 978 400
Up Recommendation 23 277 1012 547 228 724 453  
Down Recommendation 27 255 942 628 289 756 495
GDT  494 256 1915 736 193 1644 638
No Recommendation 436 256 1430 726 193 1379 629
Up Recommendation 26 363 1915 809 344 1644 682  
Down Recommendation 31 309 1399 814 344 1076 728
GPS  494 361 1992 839 236 1379 675
No Recommendation 432 361 1530 822 236 1379 663
Up Recommendation 32 522 1432 928 428 1133 734  
Down Recommendation 30 491 1992 998 463 1356 784
JBL  494 295 1426 796 151 1364 631
No Recommendation 448 295 1426 795 151 1364 628
Up Recommendation 24 450 1279 813 402 980 675  
Down Recommendation 22 510 1172 799 394 954 637
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Table 2 (cont’d) 
Summary statistics for the daily numbers of buys and sells 
 
Buy Sell Ticker Period Number of Observation min max mean min max mean
LU  494 417 2732 1269 553 2724 1331
No Recommendation 442 417 2732 1261 553 2724 1334
Up Recommendation 28 673 2376 1362 709 1896 1295  
Down Recommendation 24 626 1978 1300 749 1948 1316
MOT  494 438 2011 1299 435 1946 1221
No Recommendation 447 438 2011 1292 435 1946 1211
Up Recommendation 22 724 1771 1355 872 1553 1337  
Down Recommendation 25 1062 1769 1386 999 1794 1290
MRK  494 436 2448 1229 370 2719 1134
No Recommendation 448 436 2230 1208 370 2719 1116
Up Recommendation 23 858 2448 1448 778 2173 1332  
Down Recommendation 23 874 2237 1417 773 2153 1276
NOK  494 411 2069 1235 529 1834 1155
No Recommendation 433 465 2069 1231 529 1834 1155
Up Recommendation 32 944 1763 1283 852 1711 1173  
Down Recommendation 29 411 1569 1244 547 1656 1149
PCS  494 339 1834 859 284 1442 721
No Recommendation 425 339 1632 836 284 1442 705
Up Recommendation 35 555 1834 977 480 1345 808  
Down Recommendation 33 558 1709 1024 524 1409 831
Q  494 289 1875 943 416 1690 918
No Recommendation 419 289 1725 919 416 1690 902
Up Recommendation 36 663 1846 1099 525 1579 995  
Down Recommendation 38 534 1875 1057 468 1506 1007
RD  494 358 2141 966 311 1946 857
No Recommendation 450 358 2141 955 311 1879 847
Up Recommendation 22 597 2002 1072 485 1946 957  
Down Recommendation 21 538 1687 1090 536 1613 956
RIG  494 390 1878 1064 145 1601 866
No Recommendation 444 390 1878 1053 145 1601 855
Up Recommendation 25 680 1603 1172 471 1333 922  
Down Recommendation 24 500 1656 1156 468 1581 1000
SAP  494 42 904 274 54 606 213
No Recommendation 446 42 904 267 54 552 208
Up Recommendation 22 164 711 343 131 606 273  
Down Recommendation 25 143 611 330 132 460 249
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Table 2 (cont’d) 
Summary statistics for the daily numbers of buys and sells 
 
Buy Sell Ticker Period Number of Observation min max mean min max mean
SBC  494 522 2450 1405 542 2413 1364
No Recommendation 441 522 2450 1392 542 2413 1359
Up Recommendation 27 741 2373 1526 842 2209 1409  
Down Recommendation 26 1115 2411 1502 914 2238 1416
SGP  494 463 2288 1012 390 1911 907
No Recommendation 449 463 2288 1005 390 1911 898
Up Recommendation 21 712 1890 1146 524 1759 1012  
Down Recommendation 24 599 2085 1036 751 1707 981
SLR  494 367 1630 864 268 1375 748
No Recommendation 451 367 1630 862 268 1343 746
Up Recommendation 21 505 1504 890 487 1375 751  
Down Recommendation 22 493 1271 864 504 1205 786
T  494 388 1899 1012 441 1844 1090
No Recommendation 445 401 1899 1008 441 1844 1086
Up Recommendation 25 388 1432 1024 644 1629 1088  
Down Recommendation 24 755 1637 1065 832 1545 1170
VZ  494 462 2717 1463 414 2243 1302
No Recommendation 448 462 2689 1439 414 2243 1279
Up Recommendation 21 1095 2447 1681 801 2238 1569  
Down Recommendation 25 978 2717 1716 982 2122 1502
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CHAPTER 4 
ANALYSES OF THE EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
This chapter presents the empirical findings of this study. Section 1 examines 
whether the parameters in the likelihood function (3.2), namely the probability of an in-
formation event (α), the probability of a bad news or low signal (δ), the arrival rate of un-
informed buy orders (εb), the arrival rate of uninformed sell orders (εs), and the arrival 
rate of informed traders (μ), have significant differences in the different recommendation 
periods. Section 2 presents the findings about the probabilities of information-based trad-
ing, both unconditional and conditional. Section 3 reports the results of the robustness 
test. And Section 4 discusses the possible determinant factors of the probability of infor-
mation-based trading. 
4.1 TESTS ON THE CHANGE OF THE PARAMETERS 
Based on the data set of daily buys and sells, we estimate the parameters α, δ, εb, 
εs and μ of each firm in each of the three periods, using the maximum likelihood tech-
nique. The descriptive summary of the estimated parameters across the thirty firms are 
given in Table 3. To test the hypotheses about whether there are significant changes for 
the parameter estimates in recommendation periods compared to the no-recommendation 
period, the technique used is the of likelihood ratio test. The results of each parameter are 
discussed respectively in Tables 4 to 11 (with Table 6 showing the descriptive summary 
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of gamma and beta). The significance and the direction of the changes of each parameter 
in different recommendation periods are summarized in Table 12. 
Table 3 
Descriptive summary of the estimated parameters across the thirty firms 
  
Estimate in the no-
recommendation 
period 
Estimate in the up-
recommendation 
period 
Estimate in the 
down-
recommendation 
period 
minimum 0.2925 0.1818 0.1667 
maximum 0.7252 0.8333 0.8387 
0.4397 0.4503 mean 0.4240 (0.4863) (0.1138) 
0.1506 0.1355 
alpha (α) 
Standard 
Deviation 0.0865 (0.0039)** (0.0184)* 
       
minimum 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
maximum 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
0.3706 0.2546 mean 0.2824 (0.1667) (0.6259) 
0.3867 0.3103 
delta (δ) 
Standard 
Deviation 0.2392 (0.0118)* (0.1672) 
       
minimum 221.8934 218.1051 315.6611 
maximum 1458.6111 1608.6395 1653.9981 
904.2720 863.4730 mean 795.8510 (0.0000)** (0.0019)** 
355.9412 338.9268 
epsilon 
buy (εb) 
Standard 
Deviation 310.7134 (0.4688) (0.6428) 
       
minimum 214.0170 297.9744 215.4166 
maximum 1402.2740 1524.7733 1493.1513 
814.9952 852.7668 mean 767.1952 (0.0171)* (0.0000)** 
315.3039 338.0131 
epsilon 
sell (εs) 
Standard 
Deviation 320.2864 (0.9333) (0.7737) 
       
minimum 201.3435 222.7558 185.2666 
maximum 707.9679 770.1857 784.1525 
473.4884 459.0733 mean 399.1360 (0.0002)** (0.0027)** 
150.2908 149.7882 
mu (μ) 
Standard 
Deviation 136.2552 (0.6010) (0.6134) 
* means significant at 5% and ** means significant at 1%. 
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4.1.1 ALPHA (α) 
Table 3 describes the summary of the estimates of each parameter across the 
thirty firms, with the p-value of t-tests and F-tests given in parentheses under the mean 
and variance respectively. We can see that in both recommendation periods, the range of 
alpha and the variance of alpha are greater than in the no-recommendation period (the F-
test on the difference of variance between no-recommendation and up- or down-
recommendation periods gives p = 0.0039 and p = 0.0184 respectively, as shown in pa-
rentheses under the variance). However, the mean of alpha does not change significantly 
(with p = 0.4863 for the up-recommendation period and p = 0.1138 for the down-
recommendation period respectively). Since α increases more on average in the down-
recommendation period than the up-recommendation period, this suggests that there is 
weak evidence that down-recommendations are more credible or accurate than up-
recommendations.  
As shown in Table 4, the change of alpha, the probability of a private information 
event, is quite noisy: Among up-recommendation events, there are 16 positive changes 
meaning a higher probability of an information event, and 14 negative changes. And the 
change in alpha varies from –0.2273 to 0.2646. However, when we use the likelihood ra-
tio test to check the statistical significance of the change, only three are significant. In the 
down-recommendation period, the situation is quite similar. There are 17 positive 
changes and 13 negative changes. And the change ranges from –0.2077 to 0.1471. But 
only one of the thirty firms has a significant change in the estimate of alpha. Based on the 
general insignificance in the change of the estimates of α, we conclude that financial ana-
lysts do not create new private information through studying public information, since 
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otherwise it would be possible for their clients to trade on this information and we would 
expect to see an increased α. Furthermore, they also do not possess any direct private in-
formation, since otherwise their public announcement of this private information would 
make it widely available (i.e. public), so the probability of private information α would 
decrease. 
This result turns out to be consistent with previous findings: Easley et al. (1998) 
showed that the probability of private information events is the same across stocks with 
many and few analysts, and Womack (1996) suggested that analysts’ recommendations 
are generally based on public, rather than private, information. This also supports the 
general claim that the financial market is at least semi-strong efficient, and able to inter-
pret the public information thoroughly. The expertise of professionals can do no better 
than the market. Our finding also gives support to the effectiveness of Regulation Fair 
Disclosure, which prohibits the selective disclosure of material information of the com-
panies to financial analysts. 
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Table 4 
Analysis of alpha (α) 
no recommen-
dation up recommendation down recommendation 
Ticker  
estimate estimate change     estimate change     
AOL’ 0.5146 0.7307 0.2162 * + 0.5172 0.0026   + 
APC 0.5155 0.5703 0.0548  + 0.5000 –0.0155  – 
AT 0.4021 0.6667 0.2646 * + 0.5455 0.1433  + 
AWE 0.7252 0.8333 0.1082  + 0.8387 0.1135  + 
BP 0.4432 0.3810 –0.0623  – 0.5454 0.1022    
BR 0.3380 0.2958 –0.0422  – 0.4169 0.0789  + 
BSX 0.4773 0.2500 –0.2273 * – 0.4615 –0.0158  – 
CC 0.4720 0.5714 0.0995  + 0.6190 0.1471  + 
COF 0.5173 0.4167 –0.1006  – 0.5500 0.0327  + 
DNA 0.3265 0.1818 –0.1447  – 0.2800 –0.0466  – 
DVN 0.4284 0.4000 –0.0284  – 0.5116 0.0831  + 
EDS 0.3039 0.3462 0.0423  + 0.2857 –0.0181  – 
EOG 0.3934 0.4783 0.0848  + 0.5323 0.1389  + 
GDT 0.4627 0.4800 0.0173  + 0.3548 –0.1078  – 
GPS 0.3833 0.3438 –0.0395  – 0.3671 –0.0161  – 
JBL 0.3558 0.2918 –0.0640  – 0.2746 –0.0813  – 
LU 0.4034 0.3572 –0.0462  – 0.4584 0.0550  + 
MOT 0.4799 0.5455 0.0655  + 0.4732 –0.0068  – 
MRK 0.2925 0.4781 0.1856  + 0.3477 0.0552  + 
NOK 0.5072 0.4684 –0.0388  – 0.5870 0.0798  + 
PCS 0.3787 0.2857 –0.0930  – 0.3636 –0.0151  – 
Q 0.3899 0.3611 –0.0288  – 0.4997 0.1098  + 
RD 0.4798 0.2727 –0.2071  – 0.5238 0.0440  + 
RIG 0.4632 0.5200 0.0568  + 0.5417 0.0785  + 
SAP 0.3223 0.5000 0.1778  + 0.3200 –0.0023  – 
SBC 0.3870 0.5556 0.1685  + 0.2308 –0.1562  – 
SGP 0.3744 0.3810 0.0066  + 0.1667 –0.2077 * – 
SLR 0.3533 0.2381 –0.1152  – 0.5000 0.1467  + 
T 0.4204 0.5599 0.1395  + 0.4163 –0.0041  – 
VZ 0.4081 0.4286 0.0204   + 0.4800 0.0719   + 
* means significant at 5% and ** means significant at 1%. 
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4.1.2 DELTA (δ), GAMMA (γ), AND BETA (β) 
In Table 3, we notice the mean of δ appears to increase in the up-recommendation 
period and decrease in the down-recommendation period, although the statistics are in-
significant: p = 0.1667 and 0.6259 respectively. This does not go along with the intuitive 
expectation of higher probability for good news (1 – δ) in the up-recommendation period 
and higher probability for bad news (δ) in the down-recommendation period, compared 
to the no-recommendation period.  
Table 5 gives the change in delta, the probability of bad news given the occur-
rence of some news. In the up-recommendation period, there are 14 positive changes 
meaning higher probability of bad news, and 16 negative changes meaning lower prob-
ability of bad news or higher probability of good news. The change in delta varies from –
0.5658 to 0.9639. In the down-recommendation period, there are 11 positive changes and 
19 negative changes with the change ranging from –0.8595 to 0.5953. When we check 
the significance of the change in δ using the likelihood ratio test (conditional probability 
of bad news, given the occurrence of some news), the results are quite mixed: in the up-
recommendation period, there are 11 firms having significantly higher, 4 significantly 
lower and 15 insignificantly changed δ; and in the down-recommendation period, there 
are 3 higher, 5 lower and 22 insignificant.  
As discussed above, we calculate γ (the unconditional probability of bad-news or  
probability of a bad-news day) and β (the unconditional probability of good-news or 
probability of a good-news day) respectively. The descriptive summary of these are given 
in Table 6. Gamma ranges from 0.0000 to 0.7252 in the no-recommendation period, 
0.0000 to 0.8333 in the up-recommendation period and 0.0000 to 0.8387 in the down-
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recommendation period. The mean of gamma increases in up-recommendation and de-
creases in down-recommendation, although not significantly. In the up-recommendation 
period, the variance of gamma increases significantly. Beta ranges from 0.0000 to 0.5173 
in the no-recommendation period, 0.0000 to 0.6666 in the up-recommendation period and 
0.0000 to 0.6190 in the down-recommendation period. The mean insignificantly de-
creases in the up-recommendation and increases in the down-recommendation period. 
The variance of beta increases significantly in both recommendation periods, although 
more strongly in the up-recommendation period. This once again fails to be consistent 
with our hypothesis, where we expect a higher probability for a good-news day (β) or a 
lower probability for a bad-news day (γ) in the up-recommendation period, and a higher 
probability for a bad-news day or a lower probability for a good-news day in the down-
recommendation period, compared to the no-recommendation period. However the 
greater variances of δ, γ and β confirm that on the days the analysts change their recom-
mendations, the market does have some confusion about the information signals of the 
firms.  
Checking the significance of the change in γ (unconditional probability of bad-
news) and β (unconditional probability of good-news) gives us the results shown in Table 
7 and Table 8. In the up-recommendation period, we have 8 significantly higher, 4 sig-
nificantly lower and 18 insignificant changes in γ; and 4 significantly higher, 6 signifi-
cantly lower and 20 insignificant changes in β. If as discussed above, we treat either 
higher β and/or lower γ in the up-recommendation period as the time when analysts are 
accurate, we would get 8 significantly accurate firms, 7 significantly inaccurate and 15 
insignificant.  
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Table 5 
Analysis of delta (δ) 
no recommen-
dation up recommendation down recommendation 
Ticker  
estimate estimate change     estimate change     
AOL’ 0.3998 0.8948 0.4950 ** + 0.1334 –0.2664 * – 
APC 0.1175 0.4223 0.3048 ** + 0.0002 –0.1173   – 
AT 0.0169 0.0000 –0.0168  – 0.0001 –0.0168   – 
AWE 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000  – 1.0000 0.0000   – 
BP 0.0248 0.3750 0.3502 ** + 0.0000 –0.0248   – 
BR 0.3004 0.2488 –0.0516  – 0.0000 –0.3004   – 
BSX 0.0237 0.5000 0.4764 ** + 0.0000 –0.0237   – 
CC 0.0237 0.0000 –0.0237  – 0.0000 –0.0237   – 
COF 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  + 0.0000 0.0000   + 
DNA 0.5769 1.0000 0.4231 * + 0.0000 –0.5769 ** – 
DVN 0.4498 0.3334 –0.1165  – 0.7225 0.2727   + 
EDS 0.1915 0.1111 –0.0804  – 0.1250 –0.0665   – 
EOG 0.3964 0.0000 –0.3964 ** – 0.7793 0.3829 ** + 
GDT 0.3375 0.4167 0.0792  + 0.0000 –0.3375 ** – 
GPS 0.1842 0.0909 –0.0933  – 0.1816 –0.0026   – 
JBL 0.2908 0.1428 –0.1480  – 0.6622 0.3714   + 
LU 0.3497 0.2000 –0.1497  – 0.5455 0.1958   + 
MOT 0.2777 0.0000 –0.2777 ** – 0.1688 –0.1089   – 
MRK 0.4080 1.0000 0.5920 ** + 0.7504 0.3423   + 
NOK 0.1095 0.1334 0.0239  + 0.0000 –0.1095   – 
PCS 0.1914 0.0000 –0.1914 * – 0.0833 –0.1081   – 
Q 0.2689 0.0769 –0.1920  – 0.1047 –0.1642   – 
RD 0.0361 1.0000 0.9639 ** + 0.0000 –0.0361   – 
RIG 0.5658 0.0000 –0.5658 ** – 0.0769 –0.4888 ** – 
SAP 0.1539 0.0000 –0.1539  – 0.6249 0.4710 ** + 
SBC 0.8595 1.0000 0.1405 * + 0.0000 –0.8595 ** – 
SGP 0.2313 0.1250 –0.1063  – 0.2500 0.0187   + 
SLR 0.3619 1.0000 0.6381 ** + 0.3637 0.0019   + 
T 0.2521 0.7144 0.4623 ** + 0.3993 0.1472   + 
VZ 0.0713 0.3333 0.2620 * + 0.6667 0.5953 ** + 
* means significant at 5% and ** means significant at 1%. 
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In the down-recommendation period, there are 4 higher, 5 lower and 21 insignifi-
cant with γ, and 3 higher, 1 lower and 26 insignificant with β. As we can see, different 
from the mixed result in the up-recommendation period, insignificant changes dominate 
in the down-recommendation period. But again, we find 4 significantly accurate, 6 sig-
nificantly inaccurate, and 20 insignificant firms.  
The above findings fail in supporting the hypotheses on the accuracy of financial 
analysts, and indicate an inaccurate or at best a spurious ability for typical analysts. We 
regard this as support for Events (2) and (4) as discussed above, where Event (2) refers to 
the situation when analysts make inaccurate recommendations, but investors believe them 
to be accurate, and Event (4) refers to when analysts make inaccurate recommendations, 
and investors correctly believe these recommendations to be inaccurate. 
Table 6 
Descriptive summary of gamma and beta across the thirty firms 
  
In the no-
recommendation 
period 
In the up-
recommendation 
period 
In the down-
recommendation 
period 
minimum 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
maximum 0.7252 0.8333 0.8387 
0.1664 0.1200 
mean 0.1232 
(0.1433) (0.8985) 
0.2155 0.1829 
gamma  
γ = α*δ 
Standard 
Deviation 0.1386 (0.0203)** (0.1405) 
       
minimum 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
maximum 0.5173 0.6666 0.6190 
0.2732 0.3303 
mean 0.3008 
(0.4015) (0.2065) 
0.1903 0.1766 
beta  
β = α* (1–δ) 
Standard 
Deviation 0.1228 (0.0214)** (0.0551)* 
* means significant at 10% and ** means significant at 5%. 
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Table 7 
Analysis of gamma (γ) 
no recommen-
dation up recommendation down recommendation 
Ticker  
γ = α*δ γ = α*δ change     γ = α*δ change     
AOL’ 0.2057 0.6538 0.4481 ** + 0.0690 –0.1367 * – 
APC 0.0606 0.2408 0.1803  + 0.0001 –0.0605  – 
AT 0.0068 0.0000 –0.0067  – 0.0001 –0.0067  – 
AWE 0.7252 0.8333 0.1082  + 0.8387 0.1135  + 
BP 0.0110 0.1429 0.1319 ** + 0.0000 –0.0110  – 
BR 0.1016 0.0736 –0.0280  – 0.0000 –0.1016  – 
BSX 0.0113 0.1250 0.1137 ** + 0.0000 –0.0113  – 
CC 0.0112 0.0000 –0.0112  – 0.0000 –0.0112  – 
COF 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  + 0.0000 0.0000  + 
DNA 0.1884 0.1818 –0.0066  – 0.0000 –0.1884 ** – 
DVN 0.1927 0.1333 –0.0594  – 0.3696 0.1769 * + 
EDS 0.0582 0.0385 –0.0197  – 0.0357 –0.0225  – 
EOG 0.1560 0.0000 –0.1560 ** – 0.4148 0.2589 ** + 
GDT 0.1561 0.2000 0.0439  + 0.0000 –0.1561 ** – 
GPS 0.0706 0.0313 –0.0393  – 0.0667 –0.0039  – 
JBL 0.1035 0.0417 –0.0618  – 0.1818 0.0783  + 
LU 0.1411 0.0714 –0.0696  – 0.2501 0.1090  + 
MOT 0.1333 0.0000 –0.1333 * – 0.0799 –0.0534  – 
MRK 0.1194 0.4781 0.3587 ** + 0.2609 0.1416  + 
NOK 0.0555 0.0625 0.0070  + 0.0000 –0.0555  – 
PCS 0.0725 0.0000 –0.0725 * – 0.0303 –0.0422  – 
Q 0.1049 0.0278 –0.0771  – 0.0523 –0.0525  – 
RD 0.0173 0.2727 0.2554 ** + 0.0000 –0.0173  – 
RIG 0.2620 0.0000 –0.2620 ** – 0.0417 –0.2204 ** – 
SAP 0.0496 0.0000 –0.0496  – 0.2000 0.1504 * + 
SBC 0.3327 0.5556 0.2229 * + 0.0000 –0.3327 ** – 
SGP 0.0866 0.0476 –0.0390  – 0.0417 –0.0449  – 
SLR 0.1279 0.2381 0.1102  + 0.1819 0.0540  + 
T 0.1060 0.4000 0.2940 ** + 0.1662 0.0602  + 
VZ 0.0291 0.1429 0.1137 * + 0.3200 0.2909 ** + 
*means significant at 5% and ** means significant at 1%. 
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Table 8 
Analysis of beta (β) 
no recommen-
dation up recommendation down recommendation 
Ticker  
β = α* (1–δ) β = α* (1–δ) change     
β = α* (1–
δ) change     
AOL’ 0.3089 0.0769 –0.2320 ** – 0.4482 0.1394 * + 
APC 0.4549 0.3295 –0.1254  – 0.4999 0.0450  + 
AT 0.3953 0.6666 0.2713  + 0.5454 0.1501  + 
AWE 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  + 0.0000 0.0000  + 
BP 0.4322 0.2381 –0.1941 ** – 0.5454 0.1132  + 
BR 0.2365 0.2222 –0.0143  – 0.4169 0.1804  + 
BSX 0.4660 0.1250 –0.3410 ** – 0.4615 –0.0045  – 
CC 0.4608 0.5714 0.1106  + 0.6190 0.1583  + 
COF 0.5173 0.4167 –0.1006  – 0.5500 0.0327  + 
DNA 0.1382 0.0000 –0.1382  – 0.2800 0.1418 ** + 
DVN 0.2357 0.2667 0.0309  + 0.1420 –0.0937 * – 
EDS 0.2457 0.3077 0.0620  + 0.2500 0.0043  + 
EOG 0.2375 0.4783 0.2408 ** + 0.1175 –0.1200 ** – 
GDT 0.3065 0.2800 –0.0265  – 0.3548 0.0483 ** + 
GPS 0.3127 0.3125 –0.0002  – 0.3005 –0.0122  – 
JBL 0.2524 0.2501 –0.0022  – 0.0927 –0.1596  – 
LU 0.2623 0.2857 0.0234  + 0.2083 –0.0540  – 
MOT 0.3467 0.5455 0.1988 * + 0.3933 0.0466  + 
MRK 0.1732 0.0000 –0.1732 ** – 0.0868 –0.0864  – 
NOK 0.4517 0.4059 –0.0458  – 0.5870 0.1354  + 
PCS 0.3062 0.2857 –0.0205 * – 0.3333 0.0271  + 
Q 0.2851 0.3333 0.0483  + 0.4474 0.1623  + 
RD 0.4625 0.0000 –0.4625 ** – 0.5238 0.0613  + 
RIG 0.2011 0.5200 0.3189 ** + 0.5000 0.2989 ** + 
SAP 0.2727 0.5000 0.2274  + 0.1200 –0.1526 * – 
SBC 0.0544 0.0000 –0.0544 * – 0.2308 0.1765 ** + 
SGP 0.2878 0.3333 0.0456  + 0.1250 –0.1628  – 
SLR 0.2254 0.0000 –0.2254  – 0.3181 0.0927  + 
T 0.3144 0.1599 –0.1545 ** – 0.2500 –0.0644  – 
VZ 0.3790 0.2857 –0.0933 * – 0.1600 –0.2190 ** – 
*means significant at 5% and ** means significant at 1%. 
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4.1.3 EPSILON BUY (εb), EPSILON SELL (εs) AND MU (μ) 
εb and εs are the arrival rates of uninformed sellers and buyers, and μ is the arrival 
rate of informed traders. These three parameters relate to trader composition. As we can 
see in Table 3, the variances of each component are not significantly different between 
the no-recommendation period and either recommendation period. However, the means 
show significant increase in both recommendation periods. This suggests that the market 
takes the days when analysts release recommendations as information events, responding 
with more trades. 
A. In the up-recommendation period 
Now we look at the difference of those parameters between recommendation and 
no-recommendation periods for each firm. The likelihood ratio test for εb gives the most 
significant increases: 23 out of 30 firms, meaning the arrival rate of buys are significantly 
greater when analysts increase their recommendations. This suggests that investors gen-
erally believe analysts, which supports Events (1) and (2). But if we shift the attention to 
the other 7 firms, where 4 firms show no significant change and 3 firms show significant 
decrease, we find something more interesting. The 3 firms with significantly lower buys 
(EOG, MOF and RIG) are among the ones where analysts are accurate, higher β or lower 
γ in the up-recommendation period. As we discuss above, generally speaking, analysts 
are not good at forecasting the occurrence of an information event and at timing their 
recommendations. But when they do in fact do a good job, investors choose not to be-
lieve them and do the opposite. However when analysts are definitely wrong by giving an 
up-recommendation on the days with higher probabilities of bad-news or lower probabili-
ties of good-news, the uninformed buys increase with no exception. So putting this to-
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gether, we conclude that most of the time investors believe analysts’ recommendations, 
but sometimes they do not. Unfortunately investors do not know when they should and 
should not believe analyst recommendations, and quite often they make bad choices by 
believing when they should not believe and vice versa. 
Furthermore, we find that the arrival rate of uniformed sells show 18 significant 
increases, 6 significant decreases and 6 insignificant changes, and the arrival rate of in-
formed traders shows 20 significant increases, 5 significant decreases and 5 insignificant 
changes. To test the null hypothesis there are no more increases (either no change17 or 
decrease) of each component in the recommendation period, we use the sign test, which 
is a common nonparametric method to test hypotheses about the median of a population 
distribution when we have before-and-after matched pairs of data for a sample. The as-
sumption we have for the test is that the probability of a plus sign and a minus sign are 
equally likely (50%) for each and the distribution is binomial. The hypotheses are re-
jected for εb and μ at the 5% significance level (p-value equal to 0.0007 and 0.0214 re-
spectively). But for the uninformed sells εs, we failed to reject the null (p-value 0.1002). 
So we conclude that although the mean of each component of trade increases signifi-
cantly in both recommendation periods as shown in Table 3, for individual firms, we can 
only expect a higher arrival rate of uninformed buyers and informed traders in the up-
recommendation period. The increase in arrival rate of the uninformed seller is not sig-
nificant, (although this is close to being marginally significant).  
                                                 
17 Here we treat the insignificant changes as zero. We double check this using the original sign, and it turns 
out that all trader components increase in both up- and down-recommendation periods, which means higher 
arrival rates in recommendation periods. This is consistent with the finding of Easley et al. (1998) that there 
were significant differences in both informed and uninformed arrival rates across the stocks with high and 
low analyst following. And we conclude that the arrival rate of all traders increase on the recommendation 
days, the only issue is whether the increase is significant or insignificant.  
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Table 9 
Analysis of epsilon buy (εb) 
no rec-
ommen-
dation 
up recommendation down recommendation 
Ticker  
estimate estimate ∆ % ∆   estimate ∆ 
% 
∆   
AOL’ 1459 1609 150 10% ** + 1422 –37 –3% ** –
APC 869 969 100 12% ** + 846 –22 –3% * –
AT 419 405 –14 –3% – 402 –17 –4% * –
AWE 922 1035 114 12% ** + 1011 89 10% ** +
BP 420 526 106 25% ** + 429 9 2% +
BR 587 634 47 8% ** + 551 –36 –6% ** –
BSX 397 670 274 69% ** + 490 94 24% ** +
CC 385 468 83 21% ** + 376 –10 –2% –
COF 764 1062 297 39% ** + 1000 236 31% ** +
DNA 668 941 273 41% ** + 718 51 8% ** +
DVN 452 456 4 1% + 542 90 20% ** +
EDS 652 798 146 22% ** + 746 94 14% ** +
EOG 473 422 –51 –11% ** – 619 145 31% ** +
GDT 648 671 23 3% ** + 658 10 2% +
GPS 728 815 87 12% ** + 881 153 21% ** +
JBL 733 729 –4 –1% – 785 53 7% * +
LU 1121 1194 73 6% ** + 1212 91 8% ** +
MOT 1181 1116 –65 –5% ** – 1278 97 8% ** +
MRK 1136 1505 369 33% ** + 1412 276 24% ** +
NOK 1079 1132 52 5% ** + 982 –97 –9% ** –
PCS 738 814 76 10% ** + 853 115 16% ** +
Q 827 931 104 13% ** + 823 –4 0% –
RD 765 1119 354 46% ** + 816 51 7% ** +
RIG 1003 909 –94 –9% ** – 973 –30 –3% ** –
SAP 222 218 –4 –2% – 316 94 42% ** +
SBC 1400 1570 170 12% ** + 1383 –17 –1% –
SGP 915 993 77 8% ** + 967 52 6% ** +
SLR 798 922 124 16% ** + 768 –30 –4% ** –
T 902 997 95 11% ** + 990 88 10% ** +
VZ 1215 1500 285 23% ** + 1654 439 36% ** +
*means significant at 5% and ** means significant at 1%. 
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Table 10 
Analysis of epsilon sell (εs) 
no recom-
mendation up recommendation down recommendation 
Ticker  
estimate esti-mate ∆ 
% 
∆   
esti-
mate ∆ 
% 
∆   
AOL’ 1402 1175 –227 –16% ** – 1493 91 6% ** + 
APC 792 789 –4 0% – 879 87 11% ** + 
AT 524 569 45 9% ** + 648 124 24% ** + 
AWE 375 479 104 28% ** + 405 30 8% ** + 
BP 514 467 –47 –9% ** – 532 18 4% ** + 
BR 506 503 –3 –1% – 562 56 11% ** + 
BSX 509 545 36 7% ** + 549 39 8% ** + 
CC 499 671 171 34% ** + 623 123 25% ** + 
COF 917 1150 233 25% ** + 1131 214 23% ** + 
DNA 501 564 63 13% ** + 608 107 21% ** + 
DVN 336 355 19 6% ** + 377 41 12% ** + 
EDS 623 741 118 19% ** + 736 114 18% ** + 
EOG 378 464 85 23% ** + 414 36 9% ** + 
GDT 603 593 –10 –2% – 757 155 26% ** + 
GPS 654 736 82 12% ** + 776 122 19% ** + 
JBL 611 675 64 10% ** + 596 –15 –2% * – 
LU 1281 1279 –2 0% – 1210 –70 –5% – 
MOT 1177 1348 171 14% ** + 1276 99 8% ** + 
MRK 1075 1012 –64 –6% – 1139 64 6% ** + 
NOK 1149 1159 11 1% + 1173 24 2% ** + 
PCS 700 832 132 19% ** + 836 137 20% ** + 
Q 882 1019 137 16% ** + 1011 130 15% ** + 
RD 865 805 –60 –7% ** – 992 127 15% ** + 
RIG 779 943 164 21% ** + 1006 226 29% ** + 
SAP 214 298 84 39% ** + 215 1 1% + 
SBC 1181 1129 –52 –4% ** – 1449 268 23% ** + 
SGP 883 1018 136 15% ** + 978 95 11% ** + 
SLR 715 644 –70 –10% ** – 732 18 2% ** + 
T 1063 962 –101 –10% ** – 1126 62 6% ** + 
VZ 1307 1525 218 17% ** + 1353 47 4% ** + 
*means significant at 5% and ** means significant at 1%. 
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Table 11 
Analysis of mu (μ) 
no rec-
ommen-
dation 
up recommendation down recommendation 
Ticker  
estimate estimate ∆ % ∆   estimate ∆ 
% 
∆   
AOL’ 472 517 45 10% ** + 556 84 18% ** + 
APC 300 245 –56 –19% ** – 490 190 63% ** + 
AT 427 346 –81 –19% ** – 517 91 21% ** + 
AWE 708 687 –21 –3% – 758 50 7% ** + 
BP 372 329 –43 –12% ** – 327 –45 –12% ** – 
BR 313 315 2 1% + 392 80 25% ** + 
BSX 373 446 73 20% ** + 424 51 14% ** + 
CC 465 672 207 45% ** + 529 64 14% ** + 
COF 683 770 87 13% ** + 784 101 15% ** + 
DNA 257 546 289 112% ** + 370 113 44% ** + 
DVN 211 223 12 6% + 185 –26 –12% ** – 
EDS 324 416 92 28% ** + 505 180 56% ** + 
EOG 223 280 57 26% ** + 216 –7 –3%  – 
GDT 304 395 90 30% ** + 481 177 58% ** + 
GPS 340 399 59 17% ** + 456 116 34% ** + 
JBL 297 363 66 22% ** + 263 –34 –12% * – 
LU 625 631 7 1% + 522 –102 –16% ** – 
MOT 354 455 102 29% ** + 288 –66 –19% ** – 
MRK 540 701 161 30% ** + 550 10 2%  + 
NOK 356 390 34 10% ** + 465 109 31% ** + 
PCS 359 616 258 72% ** + 555 197 55% ** + 
Q 378 544 166 44% ** + 540 161 43% ** + 
RD 437 625 188 43% ** + 551 114 26% ** + 
RIG 366 517 151 41% ** + 401 35 10% ** + 
SAP 201 268 66 33% ** + 201 –1 0%  – 
SBC 583 529 –55 –9% ** – 596 13 2%  + 
SGP 337 511 174 52% ** + 659 321 95% ** + 
SLR 352 486 134 38% ** + 348 –4 –1%  – 
T 374 334 –40 –11% ** – 318 –56 –15% ** – 
VZ 642 651 8 1%  + 525 –117 –18% ** – 
*means significant at 5% and ** means significant at 1%. 
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B. In the down-recommendation period 
When analysts make downward adjustments to their recommendations, the aver-
age arrival rate of uninformed sellers εs increases a lot. There are 27 increases, 1 decrease 
and 2 with no significant change among the 30 firms in the down-recommendation period, 
which rejects the null hypothesis that there are no more increases (either no change or 
decrease) of each component in the recommendation period significantly (p-value = 
0.0000) and strongly supports more increases. The statistics of the sign test for εb and μ 
have p-values of 0.04937 and 0.1002 respectively. These mean that whenever analysts 
adjust their recommendations downward, the market can expect more uninformed buys 
and more uninformed sells, but not necessarily more informed, (although this is close to 
being marginally significant). 
The poor decision that uninformed traders make about when to believe analysts 
also shows up here. Analysts are accurate when they make a downward adjustment to 
their recommendation on days with higher probability of bad-news, γ, or lower probabil-
ity of good-news, β. In Table 9, we can see that in those 4 cases when analysts are accu-
rate (DVN, EOG, SAP, and VZ), the uninformed buyers all increased; however, in the 6 
cases when analysts are inaccurate (AOL, COF, GDT, Q, RIG, and SBC), the uninformed 
sellers all increase. This once again shows that the uninformed investors unfortunately 
tend to believe analysts when they should not.  
Our observation about the poor choices investors make is consistent with the con-
cern of the CFA institute, which mentioned in its Standards of Practice Handbook (ninth 
edition 2005) that “one of the ways that research analysts have coped with these pres-
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sures18 in the past is to use subtle and ambiguous language in their recommendations or 
to temper the tone of their research reports. Such subtleties are lost on some investors 
who reasonably expect research reports and recommendations to be straightforward and 
transparent and to communicate clearly an analyst’s views based on unbiased analysis 
and independent judgement.” 
As to the significant increase of informed trading in the up-recommendation pe-
riod, we suspect those are only due to increased “camouflaging” ability. More trades by 
uninformed buyers and sellers provide cover for informed traders to transact more with-
out revealing too much of their information to the market maker. As some studies indi-
cate that a monopolist informed trader may camouflage his trading activity by splitting 
one large trade into several small trades (Kyle 1985, Admati and Pfleiderer 1988). Bar-
clay and Warner (1993) proposed a “stealth trading” hypothesis stating that during a pe-
riod of time, the informed traders attempt to camouflage their private information by en-
gaging in multiple smaller trades rather than to achieve their desired portions by one or 
two larger trades. That is to say, to avoid giving away their information, informed traders 
have to avoid trading too much. The amount of trading that they can get away with de-
pends on the volume of uninformed trading. Since recommendation changes increase the 
order flow from uninformed traders, there is a possibility that the quantity of informed 
trading would also increase (provided that an information event has in fact occurred). 
Thus days when analysts announce their recommendations provide a good opportunity 
for the informed traders to camouflage their trading, and the more trades observed in the 
                                                 
18 Pressure comes from both external sources and their own firms, and it may jeopardize their ability to act 
with independence and objectivity.  
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up-recommendation period hint that informed traders are exploiting the opportunities. We 
look at this more carefully in the next section. 
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Table 12 
The change of each parameter in recommendation periods 
In the up-recommendation period  In the down-recommendation period 
Ticker  
α δ γ = 
α*δ
β = α* 
(1–δ) εb εs µ α δ 
γ = 
α*δ
β = α* 
(1–δ) εb εs µ 
AOL/TWX * + ** + ** + ** – ** + ** – ** +   + * – * –   + ** – ** + ** + 
APC   + ** +   +  – ** +   – ** –   –   –   –   + * – ** + ** + 
AT * +  –   – ** +   – ** + ** –   +   –   –   + * – ** + ** + 
AWE   +  –   +  + ** + ** +   –   +   –   +   + ** + ** + ** + 
BP   – ** + ** +  – ** + ** – ** –   +   –   –   +  + ** + ** – 
BR   –  –   –  – ** +   –   +   +   –   –   + ** – ** + ** + 
BSX * – ** + ** + ** – ** + ** + ** +   –   –   –   – ** + ** + ** + 
CC   +  –   –  + ** + ** + ** +   +   –   –   +  – ** + ** + 
COF   –  +   +  – ** + ** + ** +   +   +   +   + ** + ** + ** + 
DNA   – * +   – * – ** + ** + ** +   – ** – ** –   + ** + ** + ** + 
DVN   –  –   –  +   + ** +   +   +   + * +   – ** + ** + ** – 
EDS   +  –   –  + ** + ** + ** +   –   –   –   + ** + ** + ** + 
EOG   + ** – ** – * + ** – ** + ** +   + ** + ** +   – ** + ** +  – 
GDT   +  +   +  – ** +   – ** +   – ** – ** –   +  + ** + ** + 
GPS   –  –   –  – ** + ** + ** +   –   –   –   – ** + ** + ** + 
JBL   –  –   –  –   – ** + ** +   –   +   +   – * + * – * – 
LU   –  –   –  + ** +   –   +   +   +   +   – ** +   – ** – 
MOT   + ** – * –  + ** – ** + ** +   –   –   –   + ** + ** + ** – 
MRK   + ** + ** + ** – ** +   – ** +   +   +   +   – ** + ** +  + 
NOK   –  +   +  – ** +   + ** +   +   –   –   + ** – ** + ** + 
PCS   – * – * –  – ** + ** + ** +   –   –   –   + ** + ** + ** + 
Q   –  –   –  + ** + ** + ** +   +   –   – * +  – ** + ** + 
RD   – ** + ** + ** – ** + ** – ** +   +   –   –   + ** + ** + ** + 
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Table 12 (cont’d) 
The change of each parameter in recommendation periods 
In the up-recommendation period  In the down-recommendation period 
Ticker  
α δ γ = 
α*δ
β = α* 
(1–δ) εb εs µ α δ 
γ = 
α*δ
β = α* 
(1–δ) εb εs µ 
RIG   + ** – ** – ** + ** – ** + ** +   + ** – ** – ** + ** – ** + ** + 
SAP   +  –   – * +   – ** + ** +   – ** + * +   – ** +   +  – 
SBC   + * + * +  – ** + ** – ** –   – ** – ** – ** +  – ** +  + 
SGP   +  –   –  + ** + ** + ** + * –   +   –   – ** + ** + ** + 
SLR   – ** +   + ** – ** + ** – ** +   +   +   +   + ** – ** +  – 
T   + ** + ** +  – ** + ** – ** –   –   +   +   – ** + ** + ** – 
VZ   + * + * +  – ** + ** +   +   + ** + ** + * – ** + ** + ** – 
Significant increase 2 11 8 4 23** 18 20* 0 3 4 3 19* 27** 18 
Significant decrease 1 4 4 6 3 6 5 1 5 5 1 6 1 7 
Insignificant change 27** 15 18 20 4 6 5 29** 22** 21** 26** 5 2 5 
 * means significant at 5% and ** means significant at 1%.  
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4.2 PIN AND CONDITIONAL PIN 
To make sure that the increase in informed trading is merely “camouflaging” be-
haviour of informed traders, we check whether there is significant change in the probabil-
ity of information-based trading in different periods. If the probabilities change in the rec-
ommendation period, then we cannot conclude that analysts just give informed traders a 
good time to camouflage their intent. And this, as we discussed above, may result in dif-
ferent behaviour of specialists on recommendation days. However, if the probabilities 
don’t change in either recommendation period, then we would say that the behaviour of 
specialists doesn’t change on recommendation days. Furthermore, this may be taken as 
evidence of market efficiency. Since we know analysts’ recommendations are based on 
public information, the announcement of their recommendations should have no effect on 
the probabilities of informed trading.  
Table 13 provides the descriptive summary of the unconditional and conditional 
probabilities we calculate with the parameters estimated above. The unconditional prob-
ability of information-based trading (PIN) ranges from 5.7% to 25.6% in the no-
recommendation period. In recommendation period, the range widens: 4.8% to 26.0% in 
the up-recommendation period and 4.0 to 29.2% in down-recommendation. This is con-
sistent with the great variance of alpha, delta, gamma and beta, the probabilities related to 
the occurring of private information events. The mean of PIN increases in both up- and 
down-recommendation periods, insignificantly in the up-recommendation period and sig-
nificantly (with p-value 0.0286 as shown in the bracket below the mean) in the down-
recommendation period. Once more, this suggests that down-recommendations are more 
credible or accurate than up-recommendations. 
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The conditional probabilities increase the range in the recommendation periods 
too. PIN|sell ranges from 0.0% to 47.4% in the no-recommendation period, 0.0% to 
49.1% in the up-recommendation period and 0.0% to 54.7% in the down-
recommendation period. PIN|buy ranges from 0.0% to 25.2% in the no-recommendation 
period, 0.0% to 33.7% in the up-recommendation period and 0.0% to 36.2% in the down-
recommendation period. Although the range of PIN|sell is wider than PIN|buy, the mean 
of PIN|sell is smaller than the mean of PIN|buy, consistent with the notion that buyer-
initiated trades are more informative than seller-initiated trades. Furthermore, the mean of 
PIN|sell increases in the up-recommendation period, and the mean of PIN|buy increases 
in the down-recommendation period, although both are weakly significant (p-value 
equals to 0.0980 and 0.0814 respectively). This goes along with our hypothesis that spe-
cialists would give a higher PIN|sell in the up-recommendation period and a higher 
PIN|buy in the down-recommendation period, based on his suspicion that on recommen-
dation days orders in the opposite direction of recommendation are more likely to be in-
formation-based trades. Besides, PIN|buy decreases in the up-recommendation period as 
we expected, although insignificantly while PIN|sell has no change in the down-
recommendation period.  
The changes in PIN and conditional PIN in the recommendation periods are given 
in Table 14. As we discussed above, if the analysts’ recommendations are associated with 
information events, we would see a high PIN in both recommendation periods. And if 
specialists know that uninformed investors on average believe analysts, on recommenda-
tion days there would be an increase in trading in the direction of the recommendation, 
and orders in the opposite direction of recommendation are more likely to be informa-
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tion-based trades, they would use a higher PIN|sell and a lower PIN|buy in the up-
recommendation period to set up the bid and ask quote. In the down-recommendation pe-
riod, lower PIN|sell and higher PIN|buy. The sign of the change of those probabilities are 
just as expected: unconditional PIN increases in both up- and down- recommendation pe-
riods, in the up-recommendation period, PIN|sell increases and PIN|buy decreases, while 
in the down-recommendation period, PIN|buy increases and PIN|sell has no change. 
However, they are all statistically insignificant according to the t-test19.  
The sign test we used to check for robustness gives a similar insignificant result. 
The number of increases of PIN, PIN|sell, and PIN|buy are 16 (p-value=0.2923), 15 and 
16 respectively in the up-recommendation period and 18 (p-value=0.1002), 12 and 18 
respectively in the down period. This shows in general the specialists would not take the 
announcement of analysts’ recommendation into significant consideration when they set 
up bid and ask prices because the probability of information-based trading, both uncondi-
tional and conditional, does not change substantially on recommendation days.  
As a further test of the indifference of specialists to analysts’ recommendation in 
general, we check the equivalence of the arrival rates of uninformed buys and uninformed 
sells in recommendation periods, and report the result in Table 15. The difference be-
tween the arrival rates of buy orders and sell orders, although quite significant, has vari-
ous signs, giving 18 significantly positive and 11 significantly negative in the no-
recommendation period, 11 significantly positive and 12 significantly negative in the up-
recommendation period, and 10 significantly positive and 15 significantly negative in the 
down-recommendation period. The sign test on the direction of the differences gives in-
                                                 
19 We use both LOGIT and TOBIT transformation to do the statistics test whether they are significantly 
different from zero, because the delta of a probability only has the value between –1 to 1, and it’s improper 
to assume a t-distribution.  However, only the result using LOGIT transformation is reported in Table 14.  
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significant results in each period, showing that there is no difference between the arrival 
rates of buys and sells from the perspective of each firm. Across the thirty firms, the 
mean of the difference in each period is slightly positive, but insignificantly different 
from zero. Although as we can see, the average of εb – εs increases in the up-
recommendation period and decreases in the down-recommendation period, referring to 
more buys in the up-recommendation period and more sells in the down-recommendation 
period, as we expected, the changes are all insignificantly different from zero. So we con-
clude that the arrival rates of uninformed buys and sells have no significant difference in 
recommendation periods. This also suggests that the specialists would not behave any 
differently on recommendation days.  
The insignificant difference between probabilities of information-based trading in 
recommendation periods, and the corresponding lack of differential behaviour from spe-
cialists implied by it, counters our suspicion of asymmetry in bid discounts and ask pre-
miums on recommendation days. So the optimism of financial analysts observed in the 
market does not seem to come from this possibility.  
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Table 13 
Descriptive summary of PIN, PIN|sell, and PIN|buy across the thirty firms 
  
In the no-
recommendation 
period 
In the up-
recommendation 
period 
In the down-
recommendation 
period 
minimum 5.7% 4.8% 4.0% 
maximum 25.6% 26.0% 29.2% 
9.8% 10.1% mean 9.2% 
(0.2524) (0.0286)** 
4.8% 5.4% 
PIN 
Standard 
Deviation 4.2% (0.4589) (0.1776) 
       
minimum 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
maximum 47.4% 49.1% 54.7% 
6.5% 4.8% mean 4.8% 
(0.0980)* (0.9964) 
10.0% 10.3% 
PIN|sell 
Standard 
Deviation 8.5% (0.3752) (0.3040) 
       
minimum 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
maximum 25.2% 33.7% 36.2% 
10.3% 12.5% mean 10.7% 
(0.8072) (0.0814)* 
8.9% 9.0% 
PIN|buy 
Standard 
Deviation 6.3% (0.0682)* (0.0654)* 
* means significant at 10% and ** means significant at 5%. 
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Table 14  
 The change of probabilities in recommendation periods 
Up- vs. no-recommendation period Down- vs. no-recommendation period Ticker 
Δ PIN Δ PIN/sell Δ PIN/buy Δ PIN Δ PIN/sell Δ PIN/buy 
AOL/TWX 4.2% + 14.8% + –5.7% – 1.0% + –3.3% – 5.1% + 
APC –0.9% – 4.0% + –5.1% – 3.2% + –1.7% – 6.6% + 
AT 4.9% + –0.3% – 10.7% + 5.5% + –0.3% – 10.7% + 
AWE 0.4% + 1.7% + 0.0% + 3.6% + 7.3% + 0.0% + 
BP –3.1% – 5.4% + –11.1% – 1.2% + –0.5% – 3.3% + 
BR –1.1% – –1.0% – –0.8% – 3.3% + –3.9% – 9.1% + 
BSX –7.2% – 5.1% + –17.6% – –0.5% – –0.5% – –1.2% – 
CC 4.9% + –0.5% – 8.5% + 5.2% + –0.5% – 11.0% + 
COF –4.2% – 0.0% + –6.9% – –0.2% – 0.0% + –0.2% – 
DNA –1.0% – 2.6% + –3.8% – 0.2% + –6.4% – 5.7% + 
DVN –0.4% – –2.3% – 1.3% + –0.5% – 4.7% + –3.9% – 
EDS 1.2% + –0.6% – 2.4% + 1.1% + –0.5% – 1.9% + 
EOG 3.3% + –5.8% – 11.5% + 1.1% + 8.5% + –4.6% – 
GDT 2.4% + 2.8% + 0.6% + –0.1% – –5.2% – 5.2% + 
GPS –0.5% – –1.3% – 0.3% + 0.4% + 0.1% + 0.3% + 
JBL –0.4% – –1.9% – 1.0% + –2.1% – 2.2% + –5.0% – 
LU –1.1% – –2.3% – 0.5% + –0.2% – 2.9% + –3.1% – 
MOT 2.2% + –3.1% – 7.8% + –1.5% – –1.6% – –0.8% – 
MRK 4.7% + 15.6% + –5.6% – 0.4% + 4.5% + –3.1% – 
NOK –0.2% – 0.3% + –0.8% – 3.4% + –1.3% – 7.7% + 
PCS 0.2% + –2.5% – 2.3% + 1.4% + –1.2% – 3.1% + 
Q 0.8% + –2.2% – 3.3% + 4.3% + –1.3% – 8.8% + 
RD –3.5% – 11.3% + –16.8% – 2.1% + –0.6% – 4.3% + 
RIG 3.5% + –8.4% – 13.5% + 1.2% + –7.2% – 9.2% + 
SAP 6.9% + –2.4% – 14.6% + –1.4% – 7.2% + –8.3% – 
SBC 2.0% + 6.7% + –1.6% – –3.1% – –11.0% – 5.4% + 
SGP 1.8% + –0.8% – 3.6% + –1.7% – –0.7% – –2.7% – 
SLR –1.0% – 6.0% + –6.9% – 2.7% + 1.6% + 3.0% + 
T 1.4% + 7.5% + –5.2% – –1.3% – 0.9% + –3.1% – 
VZ –0.7% – 3.3% + –4.5% – –1.2% – 8.0% + –9.3% – 
Mean 0.0065 0.0173 –0.0035 0.0093 0.0000 0.0184 
St. Dev 0.0303 0.0553 0.0782 0.0220 0.0447 0.0558 
p-value1 (0.2190) (0.1139) (0.4973) (0.1959) (0.3535) (0.1069) 
 
1 The p-value by using the LOGIT transformation of the probabilities.  
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Table 15 
Difference between εb and εs (εb - εs) in each period 
Ticker  No-recommendation period 
Up-recommendation 
period 
Down-
recommendation pe-
riod 
AOL/TWX 56 + ** 434 + ** –71 – ** 
APC 76 + ** 180 + ** –33 – ** 
AT –106 – ** –164 – ** –246 + ** 
AWE 546 + ** 556 + ** 606 – ** 
BP –94 – ** 60 + ** –103 – ** 
BR 81 + ** 130 + ** –11 –   
BSX –113 – ** 125 + ** –58 – ** 
CC –114 – ** –203 – ** –247 – ** 
COF –153 – ** –88 – ** –131 + ** 
DNA 167 + ** 376 + ** 110 + ** 
DVN 116 + ** 100 + ** 165 + ** 
EDS 29 + ** 57 + ** 10 +   
EOG 95 + ** –42 – ** 204 – ** 
GDT 46 + ** 78 + ** –99 + ** 
GPS 74 + ** 79 + ** 105 + ** 
JBL 122 + ** 54 + ** 189 + ** 
LU –160 – ** –85 – ** 2 +   
MOT 3 +  –232 – ** 2 +   
MRK 60 + ** 493 + ** 273 – ** 
NOK –70 – ** –28 – ** –191 + ** 
PCS 38 + ** –18 – * 16 – * 
Q –55 – ** –88 – ** –188 – ** 
RD –100 – ** 315 + ** –176 – ** 
RIG 224 + ** –35 – ** –33 + ** 
SAP 8 + ** –80 – ** 100 – ** 
SBC 219 + ** 441 + ** –65 – ** 
SGP 33 + ** –26 – * –11 +   
SLR 83 + ** 278 + ** 36 – ** 
T –162 – ** 35 + ** –136 + ** 
VZ –92 – ** –25 –   301 + ** 
Significant increase 18 17 10 
Significant decrease 11 12 15 
Insignificant change 1 1 5 
Mean 28.66 89.28 10.71 
St. Dev 146.33 209.09 182.34 
p-value (0.5776) (0.6653) (0.5234) 
* means significant at 5% and ** means significant at 1%. 
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4.3 ROBUSTNESS TEST  
As a test for robustness, we use both the days when analysts announce their 
change of recommendations and the day before (since analysts may have observed the 
signals about the private information event before recommendation release, which means 
those parameters related to the occurrence of a private information event should change 
on the days before the recommendation days) as two-day recommendation periods. The 
change in each parameter in the 2-day recommendation periods is reported in Appendix 1. 
The findings about the inaccuracy of analysts hold strongly. The change in alpha is 
slightly greater, but still mixed in the directions and insignificant most of the time. The 
probabilities of a bad-news day and a good-news day, γ and β, give 8 accurate and 11 in-
accurate times in the up-recommendation period, and 4 accurate and 10 inaccurate times 
in the down-recommendation period. Comparing this result with the result we get from 
one-day periods, there is no change in accurate times, but more inaccurate times. Once 
more the inaccuracy of financial analysts is supported.  
Appendix 2 shows the change of probabilities, PIN, PIN|sell, and PIN|buy, in 2-
day recommendation periods. The results are quite similar. So in the following test, we 
will use the results from the one-day period only.  
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4.4 INFLUENTIAL FACTORS ON PIN 
Although the test on the change of PIN, PIN|buy and PIN|sell in the recommenda-
tion periods shows an insignificant result, meaning that specialists would generally not 
take the analysts’ recommendation into serious consideration when they set up bid and 
ask prices, we are curious about whether these probabilities, PIN, PIN|buy and PIN|sell, 
are determined or influenced at least by some common factors. So we use regression to 
check the relationship, if any, between the probabilities of informed trading and some 
potential influential factors.  
The independent variables we use in the regression model are firm size, trading 
volume, and return volatility. The firm size is the natural log transformation of the aver-
age of year-end total assets from 2001 to 2002 of each firm. Trading volume is the natu-
ral log of the mean of daily trading volume in the two-year period. And the volatility is 
the natural log of the standard deviation of daily return in the two-year period.  
We understand that the industry of the firms may be relevant too. However when 
we use the first digit of the NASIC (as shown in Table 1), which ranges from 2 to 5, di-
viding the data into subgroups, the number of observations in some subgroups is too 
small for regression (As shown in Table 16). We report the mean of the probabilities of 
the firms in each industry, but we ignore them in the regression.   
The linear regression models appear as follows: 
μβ +⋅+= jji XCY                                                                                           (4.1) 
and 
μβ +⋅+= ∑ jji XCY                                                                                       (4.2) 
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where Yi represents PIN, PIN|buy or PIN|sell, and Xj represent size, volume and volatility. 
Table 17 reports the descriptive statistics of both the independent variables and dependent 
variables. The correlation matrix of the dependent variables is given in Table 18.  
As a probability, PIN, PIN|buy and PIN|sell will take a value only between 0 and 
1. This requires us to use a TOBIT model to deal with the censored data. In Table 18 we 
report the regression results. As shown, we run the regression with each individual de-
pendent variable and all the dependent variables at the same time. The regression with 
PIN as the dependent variable gives no significant coefficients to the independent vari-
ables, meaning that the probability of information-based trading (PIN) does not seem to 
be influenced by the size of the firm, the trading volume, or the volatility of the daily re-
turns. The same finding applies to PIN|sell.  
The regression with PIN|buy as the dependent variable shows significant (p-value 
equals 0.0544) influence from trading volume. The negative relationship between volume 
and PIN|buy is still weakly significant (p-value equals 0.0665) when we do the multi-
variable regression, where the relationship applies when all the other influential factors 
are held constant. This means that for a firm with larger trading volume, when a buy or-
der comes, the probability that it is an informed trade would be comparatively smaller 
than that of a less frequently traded firm, while the probability that a sell order is made by 
an informed trader, as well as the unconditioned probability of informed trading, show no 
significant difference between firms with different trading volume. Intuitively, if the trad-
ing volume of a firm is large, meaning the firm is a hot issue in the market, the probabil-
ity that the next trade is an informed trade is reasonably not as high (a negative sign for 
the relationship between PIN and volume, although insignificant), the probability that the 
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next buyer is informed is even lower and significant, but the probability that the next 
seller is informed is a little bit higher (not significant, but positive sign). However, the 
statistics about the goodness of fit are not good: R2 statistics are pretty low and adjusted 
R2 statistics are almost all negative. This jeopardizes the economic interpretation of the 
weak relationships observed above.  Therefore we are reluctant to draw any general con-
clusion based on this.  
 Further with the finding that the probabilities are generally not influenced by the 
size of the firm, the trading volume, or the volatility of the daily returns, we rank the 
thirty firms by size, volume, volatility respectively and divide them into three sub-groups 
named bottom 10, middle 10 and top 10. And then we report the mean of PIN, PIN|buy 
and PIN|sell of each sub-group in Table 20. The shaded part in Table 20 is consistent 
with the negative relationship findings between PIN|buy and volume. But still, due to the 
limited number of firms in our sample, we cannot generalise further on this aspect. 
Since we failed to find anything with significant explanatory power for the prob-
abilities PIN, PIN|buy and PIN|sell, the determinant or influential factor(s) of the prob-
abilities of information-based trading opens a further research topic, which we leave for 
future research.  
 88
Table 16 
 
Mean of the probabilities of different industries 
 Number of Observation PIN PIN|buy PIN|sell 
Industry 2 5 8.10% 11.90% 11.00% 
Industry 3 11 8.15% 12.23% 3.41% 
Industry 4 2 11.92% 8.69% 3.85% 
Industry 5 12 10.15% 9.12% 3.63% 
 
 
Table 17 
 
Descriptive statistics of the variables 
 
Table 18 
Correlation matrix of the dependent variables 
  Size Volume Volatility 
Size 1.0000   
Volume 0.5556 1.0000  
Volatility -0.1739 0.4980 1.0000 
 
 
 
 Dependent Variables Independent Variables 
 PIN PIN|buy  PIN|sell  size volume volatility 
Mean 9.19% 10.70% 4.79% 9.9113 15.3014 1.1986 
Median 7.73% 9.08% 2.92% 9.7735 15.1759 1.1830 
Standard Deviation 4.16% 6.32% 8.46% 1.2198 0.9207 0.3774 
Range 19.86% 25.20% 47.39% 4.2335 3.4093 1.3337 
Minimum 5.74% 0.00% 0.00% 7.8050 13.8767 0.6292 
Maximum 25.61% 25.20% 47.38% 12.0384 17.2860 1.9629 
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Table 19 
Regression results  
Independent Variable(s) 
Dependent 
C size volume volatility 
R2 adjusted R2 
0.0923 0.0000    
(0.1379) (0.9955)    
0.0000 –0.0741 
0.1901   –0.0064   
(0.1290)   (0.4323)   
0.0201 –0.0525 
0.0901    0.0015 
(0.0004)***    (0.9405) 
0.0002 –0.0739 
0.2545 0.0072 –0.0213 0.0149 
 
PIN 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  (0.0703)* (0.5082) (0.1395) (0.6367) 
0.0532 –0.0983 
       
0.1521 –0.0046   
(0.1168) (0.6327)   
0.0065 –0.0671 
0.4654  –0.0235  
(0.0129)  (0.0544)*  
0.1083 0.0422 
0.1423   –0.0303 
(0.0003)***   (0.3304) 
0.0285 –0.0435 
0.5313 0.0116 –0.0367 –0.6193 
PIN|buy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (0.0116)** (0.3763) (0.0665)* (0.5762) 
0.1361 –0.0021 
       
–0.0195 0.0066   
(0.8799) (0.6075)   
–0.0191 –0.0945 
–0.2250  0.0177  
(0.3842)  (0.2934)  
0.0039 –0.0670 
0.0086   0.0314 
(0.8683)   (0.4491) 
–0.0089 –0.0836 
–0.2171 –0.0005 0.0173 0.1047 
PIN|sell 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.4641) (0.9785) (0.5420) (0.9467) 
0.0043 –0.1550 
*means significant at 10%, ** means significant at 5% and *** means significant at 1%.
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Table 20 
The mean of variables in sub-groups 
Mean 
  ln(size) ln(volume) volatility PIN PIN|buy PIN|sell 
Bottom 10 8.60   9.17% 12.57% 3.10% 
Middle 10 9.84   7.86% 9.74% 7.16% 
Top 10 11.30   10.56% 9.77% 4.12% 
Bottom 10  14.31  9.42% 13.64% 6.47% 
Middle 10  15.26  9.20% 10.06% 3.59% 
Top 10  16.33  8.96% 8.40% 4.31% 
Bottom 10   0.7924 8.60% 10.29% 8.10% 
Middle 10   1.1851 9.25% 11.46% 2.68% 
Top 10   1.6185 9.74% 10.34% 3.61% 
       
Industry 2    8.10% 11.90% 11.00% 
Industry 3    8.15% 12.23% 3.41% 
Industry 4    11.92% 8.69% 3.85% 
Industry 5    10.15% 9.12% 3.63% 
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CHAPTER 5  
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we test the accuracy of analysts from a new perspective using a 
market microstructure model introduced by Easley et al. (2002). Using intraday market 
data and a trade classification algorithm given by Lee and Ready (1991), we estimate the 
probability of a private information event occurring each day, the probability the event 
being bad news or good news, and the arrival rates of different traders (uninformed buy-
ers, uninformed sellers, and informed traders) using maximum likelihood estimation. By 
comparing these estimates on days with and without recommendation changes, we find 
that changes in financial analyst recommendations do not correspond with a change in the 
probability of a private information event each day. The timing of the change in recom-
mendations is sometimes consistent with the underlying change of the probability of 
news, but sometimes it is not, suggesting that financial analysts do not always make accu-
rate recommendations. Even though they are inaccurate most of the time, uninformed in-
vestors generally believe financial analysts most of the time, although they sometimes 
choose not to believe them. Unfortunately they do this at the most inopportune times, 
choosing to believe when analysts are most often wrong, and choosing not to believe on 
the rare occasion when the analysts are right on average. These findings are robust when 
we use two-day recommendation period by incorporating both the day analysts change 
their recommendations and the day before the recommendation periods.  
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Furthermore, in light of this we suspect it is possible that a specialist might be-
lieve that orders in the opposite direction of analysts’ recommendations on recommenda-
tion days are more likely to be information-based trades, thus giving different conditional 
probabilities depending on the existence and direction of a recommendation change. To 
test for this possibility, we develop a new index on the conditional probability of infor-
mation-based trading and name the probability of information-based trade conditioned on 
sell and buy orders as PIN|sell and PIN|buy respectively. We examine whether there is 
any change on recommendation days with the probability of information-based trade 
(PIN), PIN|sell and PIN|buy, but we did not find any significant differences. This indi-
cates that although we may observe a higher arrival rate of information traders on rec-
ommendation days, the probabilities of information-based trading does not change. More 
informed traders come to the market merely because the higher arrival rate of uninformed 
traders on recommendation days gives them a good opportunity to camouflage their trad-
ing effectively. If this is the case, the specialists, quite likely, would not set bid and ask 
prices any differently on those days. This excludes the possibility that the observed inef-
ficiency of pricing to analysts’ recommendation is due to the different behaviour of spe-
cialists when setting up their bid and ask quotes. The finding of indifference of specialists 
is further supported by our finding that the equivalence of the arrival rates of uninformed 
buyers and uninformed sellers remains in the no-recommendation period and both rec-
ommendation periods. This goes along with the common assumption in previous litera-
ture of the symmetry of uninformed buys and sells.  
 We try to find out whether the probability of informed trading we estimated has 
any relationship with the firm size, the trading volume, the volatility of daily return and 
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the industry of the firm. However we don’t find any coefficient significant. A more de-
tailed study may be warranted, but this waits for future study.  
One of the limitations of this thesis is that we cannot include all the available 
firms into our sample due to the sparseness of recommendation changes as the number of 
sample firms increases. This is especially problematic since most of our findings were of 
a negative nature where we were unable to reject certain restrictions. This makes our 
conclusion heavily dependent on the power of our statistical tests, which is compromised 
by having such a small sample. Even so, because of the wide diversity of firm sizes and 
industries, we still feel confident in generalizing our findings. Further tests with a larger 
sample dataset and longer time series may warrant future research.  
Also, in this study the average of all the analysts’ recommendations available in 
each day is used. However the quality of their recommendations may vary a lot from ana-
lyst to analyst. Keeping track of individual analysts may give us different results on the 
accuracy of their recommendations. However this may limit the sample size even more 
through both the number of firms and the number of days in recommendation periods. 
This may also warrant additional research. 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1 
The change of each parameter in the 2-day recommendation period 
In the up-recommendation period  In the down-recommendation period 
Ticker  
α δ γ = 
α*δ
β = α* 
(1–δ) εb εs µ α δ 
γ = 
α*δ
β = α* 
(1–δ) εb εs µ 
AOL/TWX * + ** + ** + ** – ** + ** – ** +   + * – * –   + ** – ** + ** + 
APC   + ** +   +  – ** +   – ** –   –   –   –   + * – ** + ** + 
AT * +  –   – ** +   – ** + ** –   +   –   –   + * – ** + ** + 
AWE   +  –   +  + ** + ** +   –   +   –   +   + ** + ** + ** + 
BP   – ** + ** +  – ** + ** – ** –   +   –   –   +  + ** + ** – 
BR   –  –   –  – ** +   –   +   +   –   –   + ** – ** + ** + 
BSX * – ** + ** + ** – ** + ** + ** +   –   –   –   – ** + ** + ** + 
CC   +  –   –  + ** + ** + ** +   +   –   –   +  – ** + ** + 
COF   –  +   +  – ** + ** + ** +   +   +   +   + ** + ** + ** + 
DNA   – * +   – * – ** + ** + ** +   – ** – ** –   + ** + ** + ** + 
DVN   –  –   –  +   + ** +   +   +   + * +   – ** + ** + ** – 
EDS   +  –   –  + ** + ** + ** +   –   –   –   + ** + ** + ** + 
EOG   + ** – ** – * + ** – ** + ** +   + ** + ** +   – ** + ** +  – 
GDT   +  +   +  – ** +   – ** +   – ** – ** –   +  + ** + ** + 
GPS   –  –   –  – ** + ** + ** +   –   –   –   – ** + ** + ** + 
JBL   –  –   –  –   – ** + ** +   –   +   +   – * + * – * – 
LU   –  –   –  + ** +   –   +   +   +   +   – ** +   – ** – 
MOT   + ** – * –  + ** – ** + ** +   –   –   –   + ** + ** + ** – 
MRK   + ** + ** + ** – ** +   – ** +   +   +   +   – ** + ** +  + 
NOK   –  +   +  – ** +   + ** +   +   –   –   + ** – ** + ** + 
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Appendix 1 (cont’d) 
The change of each parameter in the 2-day recommendation period 
In the up-recommendation period  In the down-recommendation period 
Ticker  
α δ γ = 
α*δ
β = α* 
(1–δ) εb εs µ α δ 
γ = 
α*δ
β = α* 
(1–δ) εb εs µ 
PCS   – * – * –  – ** + ** + ** +   –   –   –   + ** + ** + ** + 
Q   –  –   –  + ** + ** + ** +   +   –   – * +  – ** + ** + 
RD   – ** + ** + ** – ** + ** – ** +   +   –   –   + ** + ** + ** + 
RIG   + ** – ** – ** + ** – ** + ** +   + ** – ** – ** + ** – ** + ** + 
SAP   +  –   – * +   – ** + ** +   – ** + * +   – ** +   +  – 
SBC   + * + * +  – ** + ** – ** –   – ** – ** – ** +  – ** +  + 
SGP   +  –   –  + ** + ** + ** + * –   +   –   – ** + ** + ** + 
SLR   – ** +   + ** – ** + ** – ** +   +   +   +   + ** – ** +  – 
T   + ** + ** +  – ** + ** – ** –   –   +   +   – ** + ** + ** – 
VZ   + * + * +  – ** + ** +   +   + ** + ** + * – ** + ** + ** – 
Significant increase 2 11 8 4 23** 18 20* 0 3 4 3 19* 27** 18 
Significant decrease 1 4 4 6 3 6 5 1 5 5 1 6 1 7 
Insignificant change 27** 15 18 20 4 6 5 29** 22** 21** 26** 5 2 5 
 * means significant at 5% and ** means significant at 1%.  
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Appendix 2  
 The change of probabilities in the 2-day recommendation period 
Up- vs. no-recommendation period Down- vs. no-recommendation period Ticker 
Δ PIN Δ PIN/sell Δ PIN/buy Δ PIN Δ PIN/sell Δ PIN/buy 
AOL’ 3.5% + 13.3% + –5.6% – 6.2% + –5.3% – 16.6% + 
APC –2.9% – 2.6% + –7.5% – 1.4% + –1.5% – 3.4% + 
AT 7.8% + –0.3% – 14.5% + 7.8% + –0.3% – 13.9% + 
AWE 0.3% + 0.5% + 0.0% + 2.9% + 6.3% + 0.0% + 
BP –6.1% – 4.6% + –15.4% – –1.7% – 0.9% + –3.8% – 
BR –4.2% – –0.1% – –6.8% – 0.3% + 4.2% + –3.2% – 
BSX –8.3% – 2.0% + –16.2% – –4.4% – 0.3% + –8.3% – 
CC 0.7% + –0.7% – 2.3% + 2.5% + –0.7% – 6.0% + 
COF 3.0% + 0.0% – 5.7% + –3.6% – 0.0% + –6.1% – 
DNA 2.5% + –6.7% – 9.6% + 2.4% + –3.6% – 7.1% + 
DVN 3.2% + –7.4% – 11.9% + 1.1% + –1.3% – 3.0% + 
EDS 1.6% + –3.9% – 6.5% + 4.3% + –3.9% – 11.3% + 
EOG 2.1% + –5.7% – 9.2% + 0.0% – 5.9% + –4.5% – 
GDT 2.0% + 3.1% + –0.3% – 2.9% + –5.2% – 10.5% + 
GPS –2.5% – 1.3% + –5.1% – –0.2% – 0.6% + –1.2% – 
JBL –0.3% – –1.3% – 0.5% + –0.2% – 2.9% + –2.7% – 
LU –1.8% – –0.2% – –3.0% – 0.3% + 0.8% + –0.5% – 
MOT 3.8% + –2.5% – 9.9% + –1.0% – 6.8% + –7.9% – 
MRK 4.7% + 16.0% + –5.9% – 1.4% + 9.8% + –5.9% – 
NOK –0.7% – 1.5% + –2.9% – –1.3% – 0.5% + –3.0% – 
PCS –2.2% – –2.2% – –1.8% – –3.4% – –1.3% – –4.2% – 
Q –0.6% – –0.6% – –0.8% – 1.2% + –3.1% – 5.0% + 
RD –2.5% – 2.0% + –6.7% – –2.6% – 0.2% + –5.2% – 
RIG –0.6% – –14.2% – 11.2% + –3.2% – –8.9% – 2.1% + 
SAP 4.3% + –1.6% – 8.3% + –1.9% – 3.8% + –6.4% – 
SBC –0.7% – –2.9% – 1.7% + –1.8% – –7.0% – 3.5% + 
SGP –1.7% – –0.2% – –3.1% – 2.0% + –1.7% – 5.5% + 
SLR –1.5% – 0.8% + –3.3% – 3.1% + –0.5% – 5.8% + 
T 1.4% + 8.4% + –6.2% – –0.6% – –1.2% – 0.1% + 
VZ 1.0% + 12.7% + –9.4% – 0.3% + 11.4% + –9.0% – 
Mean 0.0017 0.0060 –0.0030 0.0047 0.0030 0.0072 
St. Dev 0.0336 0.0610 0.0790 0.0284 0.0462 0.0679 
p-value (0.5204) (0.5392) (0.4851) (0.5653) (0.5259) (0.5424) 
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